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Goldsmith: Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear Power

REGULATORY REFORM AND THE REVIVAL
OF NUCLEAR POWER
Richard Goldsmith*

INTRODUCTION

Nuclear power in the United States is at a crossroads. With no
new domestic orders for power plants since 1978, the industry's infrastructure has atrophied, causing some to fear that this country's socalled "nuclear option" is in danger of being extinguished. Preservation of this option has recently struck many as a matter of importance, particularly as concerns mount about the environmental and national security implications of continuing to rely as heavily as our
society does on fossil fuels.
The revival of nuclear power from its current coma is no simple
undertaking. At present, disillusionment with nuclear power is widespread. "Nuclear" is a dirty word, conjuring images of economic
white elephants like Shoreham and Seabrook, and public health calamities or near-calamities like Chernobyl and Three Mile Island.
Even supporters concede that the nuclear option cannot be revived
without, in some way, restoring "public confidence" in nuclear power.
No one wishes a rerun of the contentious licensing proceedings of the
1970s and early 1980s, often blamed for the lengthy construction
delays contributing to the huge cost overruns that poisoned the climate for further nuclear investment.
The nuclear industry has recently proposed to solve this problem
with "better" reactors-supposedly smaller, cheaper, safer and easier
to regulate than the current generation-and "licensing reforms,"
which, it is said, would "streamline" the licensing process by eliminating the opportunity for delays caused by public "interventions."'
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University. The author would like to thank his friend
Homer, who provided steadfast companionship on the many long walks needed to shape and
clarify the thoughts expressed in this Article.
1. The industry's proposal is contained in a 110-page document entitled "Strategic Plan
for Building New Nuclear Power Plants,- which was released in mid-November, 1990. See
Nuclear Industry Unveils Strategy To Obtain New Plant Orders, 126 PuBL. UTIL. FoRT. 54
(1990).
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The thesis of this Article is that this approach-even though it has
already won the support of the Bush administration 2-will not work.
Proposals to "streamline" reactor regulation by reducing the opportunity for public participation are, indeed, likely only to prove counterproductive.
Public opposition to nuclear power is rooted in the public's fears
about reactor safety, and the "safety" of nuclear power is simply not
demonstrable given the particular nature of the risk presented by a
potential nuclear accident. More than twelve hundred "reactor-years"'
of operation in the United States without a single public fatality is a
remarkably good safety record, but it does not "prove" that an accident with the catastrophic consequences of a Chernobyl cannot happen here. The public has demanded such "proof" and both the industry and the government have attempted to satisfy this demand with
assurances that nuclear regulation in the United States has required
reactor designs and safeguards that reduce the risk of a Chernobyllike accident to less than one in a million reactor-years-a risk supposedly small enough to be acceptable.4 These assurances have operated to shift the focus of public opposition to nuclear power from
concerns about reactor safety per se to concerns about the integrity of
reactor regulation. Reviving public "confidence" in "nuclear safety"
thus requires the restoration of public confidence in "nuclear regulation," and the history of nuclear regulation in this country teaches
that such confidence cannot be obtained if the public is excluded
from the licensing process.

2. See Thomas W. Lippman, Nuclear Power Industry Has Plan To Revive Itself,
WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1990, at A14. "The Bush Administration endorsed the industry's plan
on the spot." Id.
3. See Margaret E. Kriz, Nuclear Wind-Down, NAT'L J., Aug. 31, 1991, at 2081; Ann
MacLachlan, IAEA Says World Added 9,000 MW of Nuclear Capacity Last Year, NUCLEONICS
WEXK, March 14, 1991, at 5. According to the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, there were
426 nuclear power reactors with a cumulative experience of nearly 4,762 reactor-years worldwide, at the end of 1990. Japan, NUCLEONICS WEEK, April 25, 1991, at 18.
4. The safety goal of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [hereinafter "NRC"] for
United States reactors is a maximum risk of one melt-down each 10 thousand reactor-years.
See NUREG-1150, Reactor Risk Reference Document (1987); see also Safety Goal Development Program, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,772, 10,775 (1983). Nuclear reactor designs, however, are
expected to increase in safety so that radioactive releases may occur once every 10 million
reactor-years. See Hans A. Bethe, Nuclear Power and The Skeptics, CM. TRIB., Aug. 31,
1991, at 21 (Bethe is a nobel laureate in physics and is an emeritus professor of physics at
Comell University.). Despite design advances, the NRC estimates that a severe reactor accident could result in up to 130,000 acute fatalities, 300,000 latent cancers, and 600,000
genetic defects. 56 Fed. Reg. 26,782 (1991).
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Part I of this Article examines the central features of the nuclear
power program, which collectively operated to provide it with a
unique degree of freedom from public accountability, and reviews the
early counterproductive efforts of the Atomic Energy Commission
(hereinafter "AEC") to overcome public opposition to the program by
foreclosing meaningful public participation in the licensing process.
Part II then turns to a consideration of the contemporary regulation of nuclear power by the AEC's successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (hereinafter "NRC"), and finds little evidence of any
change in conditions. Indeed, public participation has all but disappeared as the dominant mode of regulation has shifted from the licensing of new plants to the supervision of plants already in operation. To make matters worse, while the NRC is preparing for a new
wave of licensing in the near future, it has recently amended its rules
to curtail drastically the opportunity for public interventions in its
licensing proceedings.
Any effort to revive the nuclear option under these circumstances
is likely to prove a costly folly. Public acceptance of nuclear power
cannot be regained without first restoring public confidence in nuclear
regulation, and this cannot happen while the public remains shut out
of the regulatory process. Without public acceptance of nuclear power, the next accident will give rise to a public clamor for the closure
of existing plants that will be politically impossible to ignore, whatever the economic costs. An accident-free nuclear future is, of course,
fervently to be wished for, but it is a future that even an overly
optimistic nuclear industry cannot and does not promise.

I. THE EARLY REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The U.S. commercial nuclear power program was born in an
atmosphere of ambivalence that has choked its development ever
since. The nuclear age began shortly after the atomic bombs were
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "Atomic energy" was a new,
awesome and fearful reality. At the same time, it appeared to hold
the promise of great benefits, namely, abundant electricity that was, in
the immortal words of Lewis Strauss, the first Chairman of the AEC,
"too cheap to meter." Were these benefits worth the risks of unleashing the nuclear genie?
The question of risks versus benefits remains an extraordinarily
controversial question even today.5 It was no easier to decide in
5. See, e.g., John Greenwald, Tine To Choose, TIME, April 29, 1991, at 54-61; NU-
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1954, but Congress did not even try at that time. Although the Supreme Court has said that the Atomic Energy Act of 19546 embodies
a "decision to develop nuclear energy,"7 in fact, the statute does no
such thing. It is, instead, a classic example of modem "non-legislation." Unable to decide the fundamental policy question, that is,
whether the promise of nuclear energy was worth the risks, Congress
ducked the question by delegating the authority to answer it to a
federal agency, the AEC. This agency was instructed to promote the
development of commercial nuclear power, while it nevertheless assured "adequate protection" for public health and safety.' Congress
neither defined "adequate protection" nor commanded the AEC to
define it. The tension between these conflicting objectives was thus
left entirely unresolved, and the ABC was granted an entirely free
hand to resolve it.9 The breadth of this charter, one of the hallmarks

CLEAR ENERGY POLICY GROUP, NUCLEAR POWER IssuEs AND CHoICEs (1977).
6. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1955), as amended
by 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1991).
7. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
8. Section 182(a) of the Act requires the Commission to ensure that "the utilization or
production of special nuclear material will . . . provide adequate protection to the health and
safety of the public . . . ..Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 182(a), 68
Stat. 919, 954 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1991)). This has been described
as "the primary statutory standard relating to the Commission's mandate to ensure the safe
operation of nuclear power plants." Union of Concerned Scientists v. United States Nuclear
Reg. Comm'n, 824 F.2d 108, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "In its rules and decisions, the Commission refers to this standard as either the 'adequate protection' standard or the 'undue risk'
standard." Id. The terms are interchangeable. Id.
9. This unresolved tension runs throughout the Act. It is plainly evident, for example,
in two of the Act's most significant features: its preemption of state regulation and its
limitation of public liability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2018, 2210 (1991).
The scope of federal preemption of state laws affecting the construction and operation
of nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 remains a subject of
continuing controversy precisely because the Act fails to resolve the conflict between
Congress' desire to promote nuclear energy and its desire to protect public health and safety.
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (rejecting a federal preemption challenge to a California
"moratorium" on new nuclear power plants on the ground that the state provision was
directed toward "purposes" other than protection against radiation hazards); cf Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affj'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (striking down a Minnesota limitation on radionuclide releases in gaseous and liquid discharges
from federally licensed nuclear power plants that was more stringent than those imposed by
federal regulation on the grounds that Congress intended that federal law preempt state
regulations on the subject). While a preemption test that is drawn in terms of the "purpose"
of the state law in question has some surface appeal, it has proven less than satisfactory. Can
a state, for example, prohibit the construction of a nuclear power plant within its borders on
the ground that currently unresolved radiological safety questions make such plants economi-
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of nuclear regulation, was said to be "virtually unique."" °
At the same time that Congress delegated this fundamental nuclear policy question to the AEC, it foreclosed all opportunities to address it elsewhere. First, by limiting the nuclear industry's public
liability in the event of a major accident, Congress prevented the
full costs of nuclear power from being internalized, and thereby foreclosed implicit consideration in insurance markets of the question of
whether the benefits of nuclear energy appeared to justify the risks. 2
cally too risky for the state's rate payers? Should not such a law be preempted on the
ground that it frustrates Congress' objective to promote nuclear energy? Recently, in English
v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990), the Supreme Court suggested that the "effect"
of a state statute-not simply its "purpose-was a relevant consideration in preemption
analysis. Holding that federal law did not preempt a state tort claim for intentional infliction
of mental distress brought by a "whistle-blower" at a federally licensed nuclear facility, the
Court wrote that, "[flor a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have some
direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who would build or operate
nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels." Id at 2278 (emphasis added); see also
Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that an Illinois statute
that prohibited shipment into Illinois of spent nuclear fuel was preempted because of its disruptive impact on the federal atomic energy program); cf. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. City
of West Chicago, 914 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to enjoin a municipality from
requiring an operator of a federally licensed nuclear facility to comply with a local water
pollution law in implementing an NRC-approved plan for disposal of radioactive wastes
because the local law, on its face, related to health and safety concerns rather than to
radioactive hazards). "It is not clear how heavily legislative purpose is to be weighed in
determining preemption." Id. at 827.
The Atomic Energy Act's limitation on the nuclear industry's liability to the public in
the event of a major nuclear accident, the so-called "Price-Anderson Act," Pub. L. No. 85256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988)), also incorporates Congress'
fundamental ambivalence. As described by the Supreme Court, "[t]he Act had the dual
purpose of "protect[ing] the public and . . . encourag[ing] the development of the atomic
energy industry.' Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64,
(1978) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1988)).
10. Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Act "is
virtually unique in the degree to which broad responsibility is reposed in the administrating
agency, free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the
statutory objectives." Id.
11. Passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not immediately elicit the private
investment in nuclear power that Congress had sought to encourage. It soon became apparent
that there remained obstacles in the path of private investment, principally the risk of potentially vast liability in the event of a major nuclear accident. Congress responded in 1957
by passing the Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1988)). While the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act are complex, its chief
feature is the creation of a public/private insurance system covering reactor accidents, accompanied by a limitation (or "cap") on aggregate liability to the public in the event of a major
accident. The level at which this cap was set, as well as the mechanism for triggering its
operation, has changed through three extensions of the original act, the first in 1965 (Pub. L.
No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855 (1965)), the second in 1975 (Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111
(1975)), and the third in 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988)).
12. See Harold P. Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability and Indemnity, 71 MICH. L.
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Second, by preempting all but federal regulation of radiological health
and safety, 13 Congress foreclosed explicit consideration of that question in all state and local political arenas. Third, by creating the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress also foreclosed all debate
about nuclear safety in Congress itself.'4
There was a quid pro quo for this grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" to the AEC to formulate fundamental policy regarding nuclear
safety. Congress appreciated the gravity of the authority that it had
delegated, and it sought to assure that the exercise of that authority
would remain both accountable and acceptable to the public by requiring the Agency to provide the public with an opportunity to participate in its safety determinations.' 5 This requirement was expressed by section 189(a) of the Act, which provides as follows:
In any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license .

.

. and in any proceed-

ing for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing
with the activities of licensees .

.

. the Commission shall grant a

hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a
party to such proceeding .... 16
The Agency's "virtually unique" substantive freedom was thus balanced by a virtually unique procedural responsibility.
Unfortunately, this basic balance struck by Congress was soon
undone by the Agency, which structured its licensing proceedings in a
number of ways that operated to impair meaningful participation by
the public. 7 First, the Agency adopted an extraordinarily formal ad-

REv. 479, 502-04 (1973).
13. While the outer boundary of federal preemption is not clear, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text, the protection of radiological health and safety lies at the core, and thus
it is clear that there may be no state or local regulation of radiological safety as such.
14. See generally HAROLD P. GREEN & ALAN ROSENTHAL, GOVERNMENT OF THE ATOM
21-30, 266-73 (1963) (stating that "[tihe use of a joint committee rather than a House and a
Senate committee to consider legislation necessarily limits the extent to which important
issues are subject to Congressional scrutiny."). Id. at 271.
15. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 22, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 11 (1982).
The hearing process serves a vital function as a forum for raising relevant issues
regarding the design, construction and operation of a reactor, and for providing a
means by which the applicant and the Commission staff can be held accountable
for their actions regarding a particular facility . . . . mhe hearing process is essential to obtaining public confidence in the licensing process ....
Id.
16. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 189(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1988).
17. See generally STEVEN EBBIN & RAPHAEL KASPER, CITizEN GROUPS AND THE
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versarial model for the conduct of these proceedings. This drove up
the costs of public intervention and restricted the public's access to
the Agency's staff, the only source of technical expertise available as
a counterweight to that of the applicant.' 8 Second, the Commission
took the position that its regulations established adequate safety standards and that these regulations could not be challenged in individual
licensing proceedings. 19 Any effort to establish that operation of a
reactor in conformity with the regulations might nevertheless unreasonably endanger health and safety was barred. As a result, hearings
tended to focus on narrow, technical questions with respect to which
and competence, rather than
public intervenors had the least interest
20
on broader concerns of public safety.
Third, and perhaps most significant, the Agency developed a
two-stage decision process that made a first-stage hearing available21
late.
too soon to be meaningful, and a second-stage hearing too
This process was challenged by intervenors in the first contested
licensing proceeding decided by the AEC, but was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Power Reactor Development Co. v. International
Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, 2 an imprimatur
that, ironically, paved the way for the Agency's demise.
The AEC had issued Power Reactor Development Co. (hereinafter "Power Reactor") a permit to construct, but not to operate, a
developmental reactor to be located on the shores of Lake Erie, within thirty-five miles of the center of Detroit and thirty miles of the
center of Toledo. The permit was challenged on the ground that the
Commission had failed to make the "safety" findings required by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. It was "clear from the face of this statute," the Court noted, that Congress had envisioned a "step-by-step"
licensing procedure,' as section 185 of the Act indicated that an
applicant for a license to operate a facility would "be initially granted" a construction permit.2 4 It was also clear that before the Coin-

NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY (1974) [hereinafter EBBIN & KASPER].
18. k4 at 33-58.
19. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.758 (1991).
20. See EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 17, at 33-58.
21. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
22. 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
23. Id. at 405.
24. Section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides in pertinent part:
All applicants for licenses to construct or modify . . . facilities shall . . . be ini-

tially granted a construction permit . . . . Upon the completion of the construction
or modification of the facility, upon the filing of any additional information needed
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mission could issue a license to operate the facility, it was required to
make a "finding" that, inter alia, operation of the facility would "provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public."'
What was not clear was whether such a "definitive" safety determination also had to be made before issuance of a construction permit,
that is to say, whether the safety determination had to be made with
"the same degree of certitude"26 when authorizing construction as
when authorizing operation. The Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled
that such a finding was necessary, relying heavily on portions of the
Act's legislative history. Concluding that this legislative history had
been read too "broadly and out of context," ' the Supreme Court
reversed. Finding nothing in the language of the statute that was
helpful, the Court turned, "[f]or enlightenment, 2 9 to its construction
by the Commission. By regulation, 10 C.F.R. 50.35, the Commission
had "elaborate[d] upon and describe[d] in fuller detail the step-by-step
licensing procedure contemplated"" as follows:
§ 50.35. Extended time for providing technical information. Where,
because of the nature of a proposed project, an applicant is not in a
position to supply initially all of the technical information otherwise
required to complete the application, he shall indicate the reason,
the items or kinds of information omitted, and the approximate
times when such data will be produced. If the Commission is satisto bring the original application up to date, and upon finding that the facility
authorized has been constructed and will operate in conformity with the application

as amended and in conformity with the provisions of this chapter and of the rules
and regulations of the Commission, and in the absence of any good cause being
shown to the Commission why the granting of a license would not be in accor-

dance with the provisions of this chapter, the Commission shall thereupon issue a
license to the applicant.
42 U.S.C. § 2235 (1988).
25. Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which governs the granting of an
operating license, provides in pertinent part:
In connection with applications for licenses to operate . . . facilities, the applicant

shall state such technical specifications . . . and such other information as the
Commission may, by rule or regulation, deem necessary in order to enable it to
find that . . . [operation of the facility] . . . will be in accord with the common

defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety
of the public.
42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1988).
26. Power Reactor Dev. Co., 367 U.S. at 398.
27. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. United States, 280 F.2d
645 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
28. Power Reactor Dev. Co., 367 U.S. at 412.
29. Id. at 406.
30. Id. at 407.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/4

8

Goldsmith: Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear Power
REGULATORY REFORM

1991]

fled that it has information sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that a facility of the general type proposed can be constructed
and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the
health and safety of the public and that the omitted information will
be supplied, it may process the application and issue a construction
permit on a provisional basis without the omitted information subject to its later production and an evaluation by the Commission
that the final design provides reasonable assurance that the health
and safety of the public will not be endangered."
While this rule itself was less than entirely clear concerning just what
safety findings were required at each stage of the proceeding, the
Commission interpreted it to permit a construction permit to be issued
on the basis of a "provisional," rather than a "definitive," finding of
safety-a determination that resembled less a "finding" of safety than
a "prediction" that information not available at the first stage would
become available during construction and would support a definitive
safety finding at the second stage of the licensing proceeding.32 This
was an interpretation that the Court said was deserving of the "respect which is customarily given to a practical administrative construction of a disputed statutory provision." 33 This was particularly
so, the Court added, where, as here, there was "good reason"34 for
postponing the "definitive" safety determination. The Court observed
that "nuclear reactors are fast-developing and fast-changing. What is
up to date now may not, probably will not, be as acceptable tomorsolved tomorrow,
row. Problems which seem insuperable now may be
35
perhaps in the very process of construction itself."
The intervenors had challenged this wisdom. In their view, the
integrity of a safety finding after a license applicant had invested
millions in construction was hopelessly compromised. In the course of
its opinion, the majority had endeavored to allay this concern by
noting that the Commission itself, in issuing the challenged construction permit, had emphasized that its decision was "tentative and preliminary, and that it was by no means committed to the issuance of
an operating license." Furthermore, Power Reactor had "been on
notice since before the first shovel of dirt was moved" that its "construction permit [w]as provisional upon further demonstration of many
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

10 C.F.R. § 50.35 (1991).
Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id.
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technological and financial facts, including the complete safety of the
reactor."3 6 To these bland assurances, the majority added its own endorsement: the Commission could "be counted on, when the time
comes to make a definitive safety finding, wholly to exclude the
consideration that [Power Reactor] will have made an enormous in37
vestment. ,
Justice Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Black. In their view,
the majority's presumption of regularity seemed optimistic, if not just
plain naive. "[W]hen millions have been invested," Justice Douglas
wrote, "the momentum is on the side of the applicant, not on the side
of the public. The momentum is not only generated by the desire to
salvage an investment. No agency wants to be the architect of a
'white elephant."'' 38
This dissent proved prophetic. The majority's declaration of faith
in the purity of the AEC's decisional process not only rang hollow at
the time, but has also been mocked by history. Nuclear power plants
have cost billions, not millions, to construct, and the annals of the
Commission are filled with examples of decisions to issue operating
licenses that seem more concerned with relieving a utility of the
crushing financial burden of an unproductive billion dollar "white
elephant" than with safety.39
Power Reactor's endorsement of a licensing procedure that postponed the requirement for a "definitive" safety finding until the issuance of an operating license, the second step in the two-step licensing
process, operated in a number of ways to undermine the public's
confidence in nuclear regulation. First, and most obviously, it simply
strained credulity to believe that a "definitive" finding of reactor
safety-as complex, imprecise and inherently subjective as it
was 4 -would not be influenced by the fact that an enormous invest-

36. Id. at 402.
37. Id. at 415. In fact, the majority went one step further and explicitly stated that

"[w]e can not assume that the Commission will exceed its powers, or that these many
safeguards to protect the public interest will not be fully effective." Id. at 415-16.
38. Id. at 417 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. See generally UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SAFETY SECOND: TIE NRC AND
AMERICA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (1987) [hereinafter SAFETY SECOND] (noting that the
NRC classifies problems as -generie and then fails to deal with them). The NRC has left
some of the most serious safety problems unresolved for years, in some instances for longer
than a decade. This practice contributes to the economic and safety risks posed by operating
reactors. Id.

40. The Commission has attempted to formulate "safety" goals in quantitative terms that
carry with them a suggestion of precision and objectivity. See Safety Goals Policy Statement,
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ment had already been made in the construction of the facility. The
Power Reactor majority's assertion to the contrary-based on the fact
that an applicant was on "notice long since that it proceeds with
construction at its own risk [and with knowledge] that all its funds
may go for naught" 41-was a formalist fiction that convinced few.
Doubts about the integrity of the Commission's "safety" findings thus
grew.
Second, when it turned out-as it frequently did-that a safety
question that could not be resolved "definitively" at the construction
permit stage still could not be resolved after construction had been
completed and an application for an operating license had been filed,
the Commission developed yet another technique for continuing to
avoid a "definitive" determination. The safety question would be
labeled "generic" and the Commission would remove it from the individual licensing proceeding with the promise that it would be resolved elsewhere, in a "generic" proceeding. In the meantime, the
Commission would rule that there was "reasonable assurance" that the
reactor in question could operate without undue risk to public health
and safety "pending" generic resolution. Issues treated in this fashion
came to be described as "unresolved safety issues" (hereinafter
"USIs"), and as scores of USIs accumulated, confidence in the integrity of the Commission's licensing proceedings fell further.42
Third, the postponement of the definitive safety finding until the
second stage of the licensing proceeding had a dramatic impact on
the role-or at least the perceived role-of the Commission staff in
the licensing process. During the construction period, the staff subjected the project'to rigorous review and typically made many suggestions that were incorporated into the proposed plant as the details
were developed that would enable the "preliminary" design approved
at the first stage of the proceeding to receive "final" approval. Not
surprisingly, once the staff had satisfied itself that the application for
final approval was in order, the staff-rather than the applicant-emerged at the second-stage hearings as the major proponent of

48 Fed. Reg. 10,772, 10,775 (1983) (requiring that plant designs "assure" that the "likelihood" of an accident resulting in a large-scale core melt is "less than one in 10,000" per
year of operation). Whether these "goals" are satisfied by any individual reactor remains, of
course, a matter of "judgment." 1d; see also supra note 4.
41. Power Reactor Dev. Co., 367 U.S. at 415.
42. See SAFETY SECOND, supra note 39, at 12-32. By 1976 the NRC staff could count
355 USIs. Id. at 16.
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the operating license.43 Justice Douglas had anticipated this transformation of the staff, from analyst to advocate, in his Power Reactor
dissent," but interested members of the public who were participants
in the proceeding (and far less sophisticated than Justice Douglas
about the functioning of administrative agencies) were exasperated.45
Operating license proceedings thus increasingly became a source
of public frustration, rather than of public confidence as Congress had
hoped.' Public opposition to nuclear power became more widespread and militant.47 More significantly, the focus of this opposition
shifted from "nuclear safety" to "nuclear regulation," and the new
focus struck a more responsive chord. Whereas "nuclear safety" was a
matter that appeared to raise issues of hopeless scientific complexity
intelligible only to a few, questions about the integrity of "nuclear
regulation" appeared more within the ordinary ken. 48 The ABC itself
increasingly came under attack, and it soon became a matter of conventional wisdom, however much an oversimplification, that the
AEC's responsibility to regulate nuclear safety had been inherently
compromised by its having been joined with the "inconsistent" responsibility to promote the development of nuclear energy.4 9 The

43. Ua at 48-52.
44. Power Reactor Dev. Co., 367 U.S. at 416-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. The staff's perceived role as advocate for the applicant was, in the view of Harold
Green, perhaps the most respected scholar in the field, one of the primary causes of the
public's distrust of nuclear regulation. Green observed:
By the time a case is set for public hearing . . . the AEC staff ha[s] already
concluded that the construction permit or license should issue. The hearing itself is
in reality staged for the purpose of obtaining a ratification of that decision. Perhaps
the single greatest reason for the credibility gap is that in public hearings the AEC
itself is always seen by the public as vigorously defending the applicant and fighting the intervenor, playing the role, as many people perceive it, of an enemy rather than a protector of the public interest.
See AEC Licensing Procedure and Related Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1971).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1957).
47. See Eric Charles Woychick, California's Nuclear Disposal Law Confronts The
Nuclear Waste Management Dilemma: State Power to Regulate Reactors, 14 ENVTL. L. 359,
426-41, 445-46 (1984); see generally Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law &
Science In America, 75 GEO. L.J. 1341 (1987); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary
Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Post-Modern Cultural Form, 89
MICH. L. REV. 707, 737-42 (1991); David M. Alpem, Three Mile Island's Legacy, NEWsWEEK, April 7, 1980 at 33-34.
48. See EBBIN & KAsPER, supra note 17, at 187-204.
49. See SAFETY SECOND, supra note 39, at 4. "Mhe AEC was, first and foremost, a
promoter-a role mandated by the Atomic Energy Act itself. Strict regulation was at loggerheads with the AEC's promotional bent." Id.
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clamor for reform was eventually satisfied by passage of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974.' This statute abolished the AEC and
divided the responsibilities for regulating and promoting nuclear power between two newly created agencies by transferring the former to a
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5' and the latter to an Energy Research and Development Administration (hereinafter "ERDA"). 2
Congress, like the public at large, was obviously far more comfortable dealing with the issue of nuclear safety by reorganizing the
federal bureaucracy than by addressing the merits.
Prior to its demise, the AEC had reacted to mounting public
criticism, not surprisingly, by lashing out at its critics. Given the
tendency of nuclear scientists and engineers to comprehend the problem of reactor safety primarily as technical, rather than political,
Agency officials began to treat all criticism of nuclear regulation as if
it came from a comparative handful of noisy and misguided members
of a counter-culture that was perceived to be anti-technology and antigovernment. Public interventions in licensing proceedings, viewed in
this light, were seen as guerilla attacks on nuclear power, intended to
block a proposed nuclear facility by confronting the applicant with
licensing delays that would raise plant costs prohibitively, rather than
as good faith efforts to address a legitimate safety concern, 3 and the
Agency responded by attempting to curtail public participation in its
licensing proceedings. It sought to accomplish this essentially in two
ways: first, by erecting procedural barriers to intervention in the form
of tightened requirements for standing, pleading and discovery' and
second, by removing more issues from individual licensing proceedings and undertaking to resolve them either in generic proceedings55
or, in some cases, entirely outside any public hearing process.56
This second technique-the shunting of issues from individual

50.
51.

Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 5841 (1983).

52.

42 U.S.C. § 5811 (1983).

53. Former AEC Chairman James Schlesinger called licensing hearings "happy hunting
grounds" for lawyers and intervenors, who practiced "delaying tactics, blackmail and the like."
Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1973).
54. See 37 Fed. Reg. 15,132 (1972) ("restructuring" the rules of practice in licensing
proceedings).
55. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 499 F.2d 1069
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
56. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs* Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (vacating the Commission's procedural rules that called for resolution of
-environmental" issues in licensing proceedings outside the hearing process).
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adjudications of license applications to generic rulemakings-was far
less heavy-handed than the first, since it was obviously more efficient
for the Agency to consider truly generic safety issues in a single
rulemaking rather than in numerous individual licensingsY It could
also be argued that generic consideration would enhance the value of
public proceedings, at least in theory, by enabling all parties-the
Commission, the industry, and the public-to concentrate their resources and thus bring more expertise to bear upon resolution of the
issues. 5 ' These, in fact, were the justifications offered by the Agency
for two high-profile rulemakings that it initiated in the early 1970s to
treat two controversial contentions that had been raised in a number
of then ongoing licensing proceedings: (1) that radionuclide releases
from the normal operation of nuclear power plants were not "as low
as practicable ' 59 and (2) that such plants were not equipped with
adequate emergency core cooling systemsP While these rulemakings
failed to escape entirely the procedural wrangling and acrimony of the
licensing proceedings in which the issues had first been raised, they
nevertheless appeared to fulfill the substantive promise of generic
proceedings. A far more thorough and searching inquiry was conducted in each of the rulemakings than could have occurred in any individual licensing proceeding, making an obvious contribution to nuclear safety.6'
Far less obvious was the detrimental impact of these generic
proceedings on the quality of public participation in the individual
licensing proceedings in which the generic issues had first emerged.
An example is provided by the operating license proceeding for Boston Edison's Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, which was initiated by
the AEC in April, 1971.62 A number of citizens' groups petitioned
to intervene, contending that the plant's emergency core cooling system (hereinafter "ECCS") was not adequate to safeguard against a

57. Cf. Ecology Action v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 492 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974)
(upholding generic consideration of environmental issues).
58. Id. at 1002 (stating that "generic' proceedings would seem to benefit all parties,
particularly the poorly-financed environmental groups.").
59. See 36 Fed. Reg. 11,113 (1971).
60. See 36 Fed. Reg. 22,774 (1971).
61. The rulemaking concerned with the adequacy of emergency core cooling systems
[hereinafter "ECCS") is discussed in EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 17, at 122-38.
62. Union of Concerned Scientists, 499 F.2d at 1073. In 1982, the Boston Edison
Company was fined $550,000 by the NRC for safety violations at its Pilgrim Nuclear Power
Station. See Pete Earley, No Warning Systems, WASH. PosT, Feb. 3, 1982, at A21; see also
36 Fed. Reg. 7,696 (1971).
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loss of coolant accident (hereinafter "LOCA"), the most severe accident the plant was supposedly designed to withstand.6 3 Controversy
over the effectiveness of the ECCS had erupted in 1970 after it failed
its first test. In response to the mounting anxiety over the widely
publicized risks of a core "meltdown" that could be anticipated in the
event of an ECCS failure at an operating plant-the so-called "China
Syndrome"-the AEC, in June of 1971, without hearings, issued an
"interim policy statement" that adopted guidelines for ECCS performance that were to remain in effect, the Agency said, until on-going
research was completed.' These guidelines failed to satisfy many of
the Commission's critics, who continued to recommend a moratorium
on nuclear power plant licensing until the reliability of ECCS performance was sufficiently assured.6" The Commission responded to
this pressure in November of 1971 by announcing its commencement
of a rulemaking proceeding to consider whether to amend or make
permanent the June guidelines. 6 Following this announcement, the
Licensing Board in the Pilgrim proceeding ruled that, in light of this
now pending rulemaking, it would be inappropriate for the Board to
entertain challenges to the validity of the ECCS guidelines in a licensing proceeding.6 7
On the other hand, the Board also ruled that a contention that
the Pilgrim plant did not comply with the interim guidelines would be
entertained. 68 The citizens' group intervenors who had sought to
raise broad questions about a highly controversial aspect of reactor
safety were thus told that they would be permitted to raise only a
narrower question, which, in fact, they believed to be meaningless:
whether or not the Pilgrim ECCS complied with standards that the
intervenors believed to be inadequate from the outset.69 Needless to
say, the opportunity to "participate" in the resolution of this issue in
these circumstances could only have been more frustrating than satisfying, and this sort of frustration was not likely to be relieved by an

63. Union of Concerned Scientists, 499 F.2d at 1073.
64. Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water Power Reactors, 36
Fed. Reg. 12,247 (1971).
65. See David Douglas Spencer, Note, The Duty to Participate in Agency Rulemaking,
54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 628, 642-45 (1986).
66. See 36 Fed. Reg. 22,774 (1971).
67. See Union of Concerned Scientists, 499 F.2d at 1080 (upholding the granting of a
license).
68. See id. at 1091 (discussing Union of Concerned Citizens Contention No. 9, the sole
contention admitted by the Board).
69. Id at 1085-86.
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invitation to "participate" in a rulemaking.
Not long after the ECCS rulemaking, the AEC amended its rules
of practice to institutionalize the procedure followed in that case.7"
Challenges to the validity of safety standards embedded in the
Commission's rules would no longer be permitted in individual licensing proceedings. 7 ' Intervenor contentions that raised broad questions concerning reactor safety in general could still be raised, but
only by a petition for rulemaking. The implications for public participation in nuclear regulation were clear. Most proposals to build and
operate nuclear power plants arouse concerns about health and safety,
deeply felt concerns that go to the perceived quality of life in the
local community, and many of those affected are simply not going to
find it acceptable to have those concerns addressed by a "rulemaking"
in Washington, D.C. or Bethesda, Maryland.72 The Commission, in
fact, acknowledged as much by generally venuing licensing hearings
in the vicinity of a proposed plant.73 What this reveals is that, given
the technical complexity of reactor safety, no single "public hearing"
was going to be able to accomplish the two objectives that Congress
had in mind for licensing proceedings. Assuring reactor safety required one approach, while eliciting public acceptance of nuclear
power required another. Both objectives could not be served simultaneously by the same "full, free and frank discussion"74 that had been
70. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.758 (1991).
71. Under prior practice, known as the Calvert Cliffs doctrine, challenges to the validity
of Commission safety standards would be certified to the Commission for resolution before
an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board rendered an initial decision. Considered a "unique
experiment in administrative procedures," the doctrine defied efficient administration and was
abandoned in connection with the ECCS rulemaking. See Union of Concerned Scientists, 499
F.2d at 1082.
72. See EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 17, at 153-54.
Citizen groups usually get involved because there is a local problem which excites
or concerns them . . . . It is much more difficult to generate public interest in
generic hearings (located, most probably, in Bethesda or Washington) than in a set
of hearings on a particular local issue. Thus, . . . an increased reliance on generic
hearings could easily become a means for frustrating citizen participation by considering important issues in a relatively inaccessible forum, for all intents and
purposes hidden from public view.
Id.
73. See EBBIN & KASPER, supra note 17, at 46 (stating that "[t]he public hearing is
usually held at the nearest suitable place in the vicinity of the proposed plant site.").
74. See H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1957) (Report of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy accompanying the bill that, in 1957, amended section 189(a) of
the Act to mandate a hearing on every application for a construction permit and operating license); S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1803, 1805, 1814 (Report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy accompanying the
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envisioned.
However impossible, this was the command of the statute, and
local citizens' groups turned to the courts for protection of their statutory right to participate fully in licensing decisions, a right that they
believed was threatened by the AEC's procedural maneuvers. Their
effort was significantly aided by the National Environmental Policy
Act (hereinafter "NEPA"), 75 which was enacted in 1970, and which
quickly became the charter of a then burgeoning environmentalism.
NEPA sought to protect the environment by requiring the federal
bureaucracy to integrate environmental values into its decision-making. 6 On an operational level, the central command of the statute
was an instruction to all federal agencies to "consider" the potential
environmental effects of their actions and, before taking "major action" that might have a "significant impact" upon the environment, to
publish an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS") that
would fully reflect the Agency's consideration of these environmental
impacts, as well as alternative actions that might avoid or reduce
them.7 7 The licensing of a nuclear power plant was, indisputably, a
"major federal action" subject to this mandate, and the AEC was
therefore obliged to issue a separate EIS for each such facility and to
consider the sufficiency of that EIS in the facility's licensing proceeding."8 Because radionuclide releases into the environment which were
associated with normal plant operations, and the risks of radionuclide
releases which were associated with severe accidents, could both be
said to be within the range of potential "environmental impacts" of a
proposed nuclear power plant, both subjects arguably were required to
be discussed in the EIS issued for the facility. Local citizens' groups
thus sought to retain the opportunity to require broad safety concerns
to be addressed in individual licensing proceedings-despite the
Commission's desire to examine such issues only in generic
rulemakings-simply by phrasing their contentions as challenges to
the sufficiency of the EIS issued for the facility, rather than as chal-

version of the bill proposed by the Senate).
75. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70a (1988)).
76. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988).
77. See, e.g., Frederick Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238 (E. Dolgin and T. Guilbert eds., 1974).
78. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (discussing that the purpose of the EIS is to help agencies to incorporate environmental issues into their decision-making process).
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lenges to the safety of the facility. So, for example, while the adequacy of the Commission's design standards for the ECCS could not be
questioned, as such, in an individual licensing, it nevertheless remained possible to challenge as incomplete any discussion in an EIS
of the potential environmental effects of a proposed nuclear power
plant that failed to address the consequences of a major release of fission products after a LOCA, even though there could be no such
release if one was required to assume that the ECCS would work.79
For this reason, environmental contentions that were really safety
contentions in disguise quickly came to dominate licensing proceedings, and since the ABC's NEPA obligations were more readily enforced by the courts than its obligations under the Atomic Energy
Act,8" the efforts of public interest groups to preserve the content of
their right to "participate" in licensing hearings quickly took the form
of lawsuits seeking redress for claimed violations of NEPA.8" These
lawsuits initially achieved considerable success, primarily as a result
of a few influential decisions by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, which not only criticized the AEC's overall implementation of NEPA as "crabbed,"82 but also faulted its generic proceedings in particular, on the ground that they failed to "ventilate"
sufficiently the important safety and environmental issues that they
purported to address. While the Commission was not accused outright of having designed its procedures in order to curtail public
participation in its proceedings, the Court of Appeals seemed to draw
such an inference and it made its disapproval clear by accusing the

79. See Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(holding that a low probability of catastrophic reactor accident justifies a lack of detailed
discussion of the consequences in EIS).
80. While NEPA's mandate was said to be -essentially procedural," see Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978), strict compliance was judicially enforceable. See generally F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN
THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSiS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PoucY ACT 49-55

(1973). By contrast, the courts have declined to recognize a private right of action under the
Atomic Energy Act. See, e.g., Simmons v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 655 F.2d 131, 134
(8th Cir. 1981). Additionally, judicial review of Commission decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act is extraordinarily deferential. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace
v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1293-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Siegel v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 400
F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
81. See Infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
82. See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
83. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 653-54 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nor. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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Agency of having made a "mockery" of its NEPA responsibilities in
individual licensing proceedings," and of having denied intervenors
the right to due process by failing to provide them "a meaningful
opportunity to participate" in its rulemakings.85
These decisions marked the completion of the shift in the focus
of the nuclear power controversy from substantive issues of nuclear
safety to procedural issues of public participation in nuclear regulation. While the 1978 decision of the Supreme Court in the Vermont
Yankee" case eventually squelched the initiative taken by the Court
of Appeals to bring direct participatory democracy to federal agency
rulemaking in general, individual nuclear power plant licensing proceedings continued to be preoccupied with concerns about "public
participation." Overall, the Commission received low grades in this
area. Following the accident at Three Mile Island (hereinafter "TMI")
in 1979, the NRC commissioned a Special Inquiry Group to study its
regulatory performance. That study culminated in a report that commented on the licensing process as follows: "[i]nsofar as the licensing
process is supposed to provide a publicly accessible forum for the
resolution of all safety issues relevant to the construction and operation of a nuclear plant, it is a sham. ' 7
The accident at TMI brought about a two-year suspension in
licensing action, but its resumption in the early 1980s demonstrated,
unfortunately, that nothing had changed. While the need to restore
"public confidence" in nuclear regulation was obvious-the accident
had involved the "core meltdown," which the nuclear establishment
previously had deemed "incredible"-the Commission's post-TMI
licensing proceedings continued to be characterized by a hostility
toward public participation.8 8 Safety concerns were now acute. They
were, moreover, decidedly "local" in nature, as TMI had required the
Commission to concede that a severe accident involving the release of
deadly fission products was possible and, accordingly, that off-site
emergency preparedness plans for all reactors were essential for ade-

84. Calvert, 449 F.2d at 1117.
85. Natural Resources Defense Council, 547 F.2d at 643, 653.
86. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
87. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CoMMISSION SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, THREE MILE ISLAND:
A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONERS AD TO THE PUBUC 139 (1980).
88. See In re Texas Utilities Generating Co., 14 N.R.C. 1111, 1115 (1981) (separate

views of Commissioner Bradford describing the Commission's hostility to public participation
in its licensing proceedings as -neurotic").
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quate protection of the health and safety of the public. 9 Accordingly, the Commission issued new regulations prescribing extensive requirements for such plans' ° and, not surprisingly, compliance with
these new requirements became the major focus of public interventions in post-TMI operating license proceedings. Public participation
in the resolution of these issues seemed particularly appropriate in
view of their essentially local, non technical character. The Commission, nonetheless, seemed to rededicate itself, with renewed zeal, to
the curtailment of public participation in its proceedings.9 For example, in 1981, in its San Onofre proceeding,' 2 the Commission ruled
that its Licensing Board would not be permitted, sua sponte, to examine the issue of whether the applicant's emergency preparedness plan
adequately addressed the implications for emergency planning of a
possible earthquake.93 Despite the fact that the plant was located in
a particularly earthquake-prone region of Southern California, the
Commission declared that the issue should be pursued "generically."'

89. See 44 Fed. Reg. 75,169 (1979) (proposed rule on emergency response plans).
90. 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 (1991).
91. Hearings of the Subconn. on Envr., Energy and Natural Resources, House Comm.
on Gov' Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sees., (1980) (statement of Commissioner Bradford
observing that the Commission's decisions seemed to be based on "some hypothetical concept
of a vampire intervenor with whose imagined potential transgressions it is obsessed . . .
92. In re Southern Cal. Edison Co., 14 N.R.C. 691 (1981).
93. Id. at 693.
94. Three years later, without having conducted the promised generic review, the Commission again blocked consideration of the issue in another Southern California licensing
proceeding. See In re Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 20 N.R.C. 249 (1984).
There are other examples during this "post-TMI" period of the Commission's continued mislabeling of issues as "generic" in order to remove them from licensing hearings. A
notable one is provided by the Commission's treatment of Severe Accident Mitigation Design
Alternatives [hereinafter "SAMDAs"]. See Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants, 50 Fed. Reg. 32,138 (1985). Even though the
Commission had conceded (as it had to after TM1) that the risk of severe accidents (those
involving the risk of a core melt and breach of containment) was not small enough to
warrant exclusion from consideration in future environmental reviews of license applications
under NEPA, it declined to allow the SAMDAs issue to be explored in individual licensings.
No explanation was offered. The Commission simply concluded that "individual licensing
proceedings are not appropriate forums for a broad examination of the Commission's regulatory policies relating to evaluation, control, and mitigation of accidents more severe than the
design basis." 50 Fed. Reg. at 32,144 (1985). The issue of course was not generic. The
"risk" of a reactor accident is a product of its likelihood and its consequences. Because the
potential consequences will vary with plant location, the "risk" of even identical radiation
releases at different plants may vary tremendously. Whether the failure to include severe
accident mitigation measures in the design of a particular plant poses "no undue risk" is thus
not amenable to treatment as a generic issue. See Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC,
869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that failure to consider SAMDAs in proceedings for
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Another example of the Commission's continuing hostility to
public intervenors came one year later in a special investigation into
the adequacy of emergency preparedness plans for two reactors located within thirty miles of New York City.95 The Commission instructed its Licensing Board to reject intervenor proffered testimony
concerning the consequences of an accident unless it was accompanied by a sophisticated analysis of the probability of such an event
(which would cost from $300,000 to $1.3 million), 96 and reversed
the Board's order allowing the silent observation of an emergency
planning drill by two intervenor representatives on the ground that
their presence might cause "overcrowding" or pose a threat to "security."97 The Licensing Board Chairman, in an unprecedented gesture
of protest, resigned over these rulings. In his letter of resignation,
addressed to the Commissioners, he wrote:
[To sit as the Chairman of the Board under the new restrictions
and rulings would be incompatible with my sense of fairness.
Unfortunately, this case has indicated to me that we do not
share a common concern for the processes which regulate the resolution of these matters or in making the NRC's legal process a finer
craft so that the quality of its hearings may be improved and public
participation increased.9"
More sweeping efforts to curtail public interventions on emergency preparedness issues were made as well. In a 1982 amendment to
its rules, the Commission prohibited Licensing Boards that were reviewing the adequacy of emergency preparedness plans in operating
license proceedings from considering the results of emergency planning exercises before authorizing the issuance of a full power license. 99 In lieu of Licensing Board review of such exercises, the
rule provided that they would be evaluated by the Commission before
it actually issued any license authorized by the Board, and that no license would be issued unless the Commission was able to conclude
from the exercise that there was "reasonable assurance that adequate

issuance of an operating license for a reactor located within 25 miles of Philadelphia violated
the NEPA).
95. In re Consolidated Edison Co., Power Auth. of New York, 16 N.R.C. 27 (1982).
96. Id.
97. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit 2), Power Auth. of New York (Indian
Point, Unit 3) (Comm'n Mem. Aug. 10, 1982).
98. Letter from Louis Carter to the Commissioners (Sept. 1, 1982), quoted in SAFETY
SECOND, supra note 39, at 57.
99. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(a)(2).
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protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."" The Commission argued that the justification for
removing this issue from licensing hearings and resolving it, instead,
as part of the subsequent pre-operational testing of nuclear plants was
that exercises held at a time closer to full power operations would be
"more meaningful."'0 ' The Court of Appeals vacated the amendment"° on the ground that it violated the public hearing rights
guaranteed by section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act.'°3 Since
the Commission conceded that the satisfactory completion of emergency plan exercises remained material to its decision whether or not
to issue a license,"° an opportunity for a public hearing on the issue had to be provided. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals once again
chided the Commission for attempting to "lightly sidestep procedures
that involve the public in deciding important questions of public
policy,"' 0 5 and sought to remind it that the public hearing process
envisioned by the Atomic Energy Act served the vital function of
providing a means by which the sponsors of a nuclear power plant
"can be held accountable," and thus was "essential to obtaining public
confidence in the licensing process which is needed if the nuclear
option is to be preserved."' 6 Thirty years after the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 had struck the basic bargain that launched the civilian
nuclear power program, the federal agency responsible for the management of that program needed to be reminded of its terms.
H.

THE CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

There is little reason to believe that the opportunity for "public
participation" in federal regulation is any less essential to obtaining
public acceptance of nuclear power today than it was thought to be
when the civilian nuclear power program was launched in 1954. The
institutional framework for resolving the question of whether nuclear
power plants are "safe" has undergone little change. The nuclear
industry remains free from many of the restrictions of the market
place '0 7 and state regulation by which emerging technologies would
100. Id. § 50.47(a)(1).
101. See 47 Fed. Reg. 30,233 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 16,693 (1983).
102. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
103. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2239(a) (West Supp. 1991).
104. 735 F.2d at 1442 ("[T]he Commission itself says that it relies on its assessment of
emergency exercises in deciding whether to issue a license.").
105. Id. at 1446.
106. Id. at 1447 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 22 Part 2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1982)).
107. The Price-Anderson Act's limitation of liability was most recently renewed in 1988.
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ordinarily be constrained, ' and federal regulation-the quid pro
quo for this freedom-remains the province of an independent federal
agency operating under an extremely broad charter and effectively
insulated0 from close oversight by either Congress"° or the
11
courts.
At the same time, nuclear safety remains a question of widespread and emotional controversy. This is so even though, in terms of
public health consequences, the U.S. industry has had an excellent
safety record,"' because the accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979
and Chernobyl in 1986 have kept the public keenly aware of the
unique nature of the risks presented by nuclear power. While the
probability of a "severe" accident is still said to be exceedingly small,
the potential consequences are tens of thousands of fatalities and
billions of dollars in property losses."' Whether or not our society

See discussion supra note 11; see also Pub. L. No. 100-408 (1988).
108. State and local regulation of radiation hazards continues to be preempted, see
discussion supra note 6, and in recently re-authorizing the Clean Air Act, see Pub. L. No.
101-549, 100 Stat. 2399 (1990), Congress appears to have closed a possible "back door" to
state regulation that had been opened by the treatment of radionuclide emissions as "hazardous air pollutants" under that statute. See Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 215-16
(7th Cir. 1982) (noting, but expressing doubt about the validity of, "an argument [that] can
be made from the legislative history [of the Clean Air Act] that Congress intended to allow
the states to adopt stricter standards than those imposed by the NRC under the Atomic
Energy Act."). Pursuant to section 301 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, facilities
licensed by the NRC will no longer be subject to the regulation of radionuclide emissions
under the Clean Air Act if the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency determines that NRC regulation "provides an ample margin of safety."
109. While the JCAE was abolished in 1974, see Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233
(1974), the technical complexity of nuclear regulation has operated to continue to insulate the
NRC from close oversight by Congress.
110. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated, 760 F.2d 1231 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986). In upholding a
full-power operating license for the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant, even though the
NRC had excluded consideration of the complicating effects of an earthquake in emergency
preparedness, Judge Wilkey, writing for the majority, discussed a line of Supreme Court decisions that he described as -unequivocal proscriptions against judicial overreaching" that
"clearly establish the limited nature of the role courts are to play in reviewing orders of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission." Id. at 1296.
111. The 113 reactors licensed for full power operation in the U.S. have accumulated
more than 1300 years of operating experience, while suffering only one accident that might
have led to any deaths or injuries to the public. That accident, the 1979 partial core meltdown at TMI, released radioactive materials that have not yet been associated with any
adverse health effects. See Lawrence K. Altman, Study of Three Mile Island Finds Negligible
Increase in Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1990, at A7.
112. In the 1986 disaster at Chernobyl, thirty-one deaths from radiation were reported in
the first few weeks after the accident. The precise long-term consequences may never be
known. A recent "worst case" analysis estimates that, over seventy years, 40,000 fatal cancers
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is willing to accept the risks of nuclear power remains a question that
not only requires the consideration of many complex technical issues,
but also presents fundamental policy choices. There can be little
doubt that those whose vital interests stand to be affected by these
choices will continue to demand an opportunity to participate in them.
Chernobyl, rather ironically, forced the proponents of nuclear
power to support these demands as they rushed to assure the American public that the Soviet reactor accident could not happen here.
What was emphasized in this public relations campaign was not only
that there were significant differences between the design and engineered safeguards of Soviet and American reactors, but also that these
differences reflected fundamentally different approaches to safety
regulation in the two countries. The Chernobyl plant was said to be
"the product of a closed society" where safety determinations were
made "behind closed doors," whereas "our nuclear industry is regulated in an open fashion that maximizes public scrutiny ....,,1 Apparently, the link between public participation in nuclear regulation
and nuclear safety, empirically unverifiable until then, had suddenly
become clear.
A.

Licensing New Reactors

These expressions of a born-again faith in the contribution to
nuclear safety made by "open government" rang hollow from the
first, for even as the proponents of nuclear power were endorsing
"public participation" in nuclear regulation, they were attempting to
secure the passage of "licensing reform" legislation that would have
curtailed drastically the opportunity for public intervention in future
licensing proceedings." 4 For many years, the nuclear industry, with
the support of the NRC, had been lobbying Congress to "streamline"
the process for licensing new nuclear plants. They maintained that no
new plants would be ordered unless unpredictable delays were eliminated and the likelihood that a plant's design would have to be al-

may result from radiation released during the accident, which constitutes only .01 percent of
all cancer deaths in the same period. See Tony Caplan, Britain's Nuclear Experts Say 40,000
May Die fron Chernobyl Effects, UPI, April 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
113. See Public Participation ii Nuclear Licensing, Hearing before the Subcomnt. on
Energy Conservation and Power of the House Conn, on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong.,
2d Seas. 3-4, 59, 61 (1986) (remarks of Congressmen Moorehead, Wyden and Oxley) [hereinafter Public Participationin Nuclear Licensing].
114. See Id.
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tered midway through construction because of changed regulatory
requirements was reduced."' Most of the reform proposals included
four major features:
(1) encouraging nuclear plant standardization by allowing
the NRC to pre-approve standardized designs in
rulemakings;
(2) allowing the NRC to pre-approve potential sites for
future nuclear power plants;
(3) allowing the NRC to issue combined construction and
operating licenses for new plants instead of requiring a
separate permit for construction and another, after construction is completed, for reactor operation; and
(4) restricting the NRC's authority to require modifications
or "backfits" in previously approved plant designs.
The impact of this package of reforms on public participation in the
licensing process was much debated. Its supporters actually insisted
that meaningful public participation would be enhanced because the
proposed process would provide the opportunity for four hearings
instead of two: 1 6 one each on plant design, site selection, construction and operation and, at the end of the process, after the plant had
been constructed, yet another hearing ifsome new facts were brought
to light that raised serious doubts about safety determinations made at
any of the prior three hearings. In addition, in a rather bizarre reversal of the position that it had advocated thirty years before, the nucle-

115. See, e.g., Nuclear Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and
Power of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Nuclear Facility Standardization Act of 1986: Hearing on SD. 2073 Before the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Nuclear Regulatory Reform:
Hearings on S. 16 and S. 836 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); NRC Licensing
Reform: Hearings on H.R. 2511 and H.R. 2512 Before the House Subcomn. on Energy
Conservation and Power of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operating License Process: Oversight Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Energy amid the Environment of the Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
116. Public Participation in Nuclear Licensing, supra note 113, at 72-73 (remarks of
Congressman Swift).
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ar industry now espoused the view that the current two-step licensing
process provided only a sham opportunity for public participation
because the first hearing was provided
too soon to be "meaningful"
117
and the second hearing too late.
Public interest groups, apparently not beguiled by the industry's
arguments, unanimously opposed the supposed reforms. Focusing
primarily on the proposal to authorize the issuance of a combined
construction and operating license, they contended that it would virtually eliminate the opportunity for public participation at the post-construction stage of the licensing process.1 8 While an opportunity for
a post-construction hearing was provided, its availability was conditioned on a showing of new information that -satisfied four stringent
tests. 119 Congressman Markey, a frequent critic of the NRC, likened
the proposed four-hearing process to a "marathon high hurdle race"
and contended that the difficulty of satisfying the tests for a final
post-construction hearing provided a "Heartbreak Hill for those opposing licensing."120 In the Commission's view, any difficulty in obtaining a post-construction hearing was not terribly significant since
an adequate opportunity to raise all safety-related issues was provided
by the three pre-construction hearings.1 2' Opponents of the licensing
reform package disagreed. In their view, the history of nuclear power
plant licensing revealed numerous instances in which significant issues
had arisen during the post-construction/pre-operational stage that could
not have been addressed earlier, issues such as the adequacy of plant
construction, readiness for operation and emergency preparedness."
Moreover, since these were typically the issues of greatest concern to
those people living close to plants, licensing reforms that operated to

117. Id. at 76-88 (testimony of Marcus Rowden, a former Chairman of the NRC, representing several nuclear industry and electric utility trade associations).
118. See, e.g., Nuclear Facility Standardization Act of 1986, Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1986) (statement of
Michael E. Faden, representing the Union of Concerned Scientists) [hereinafter Hearing on
Nuclear Facility Standardization]; see also Nuclear Powerplant Standardization Act of 1985,
Hearings Before the Subcomin. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d sess. 104, 146 (1986) (testimony of Alan S.
Rosenthal, Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel, and James K.
Asselstine, NRC Commissioner).
119. See, e.g., H.R. 1029 § 103, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), a licensing reform bill
proposed as the "Nuclear Powerplant Standardization Act of 1985."
120. Public Participation in Nuclear Licensing, supra note 113, at 2.
121. See Hearing on Nuclear Facility Standardization, supra note 118, at 49 (statement
of Nunzio Palladino, Chairman of the NRC).
122. See supra note 118.
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foreclose the opportunity for post-construction hearings seemed particularly likely to stimulate public opposition to, rather than public acceptance of, future nuclear power plants."z In the final analysis, the
claims of the industry and the NRC that their legislative proposals
were actually expected to enhance public participation in the licensing
process bordered on frivolous. After hundreds of pages' worth of testimony, delivered over many years before several Congressional committees, one witness cut through the pettifoggery rather succinctly.
"These bills are designed to encourage new orders for nuclear power
plants. [They have] nothing to do with public participation. That is
why none of the citizens' groups are124supporting them, and only the
industry people are supporting them."
Congress repeatedly failed to enact these licensing reform proposals. Then, in April of 1989, in yet another reversal of position, the
NRC decided that it already possessed the authority, which it had
previously concluded was lacking, to streamline the licensing process.
In exercising this newly perceived authority, the NRC issued regulations restructuring the licensing process along the lines of the legislative proposals for which it had unsuccessfully lobbied Congress for a
decade."z Four months later, the Commission issued additional regulations, making significant revisions to the procedural rules governing its licensing hearings. 26 Both sets of regulations were strongly
opposed by public citizens' groups on the ground that they operated
to curtail drastically the opportunity for public participation in the
NRC's licensing proceedings. Quite obviously, the Commission paid
little attention to this view or to similar admonitions that were expressed by Congressmen, who were intuitively more sensitive to the
inherent constraints on governmental decision-making in a democratic
society,'2 7 and by NRC officials, whose extensive experience in nuclear power plant licensing proceedings had persuaded them that the
Commission's stubborn dedication to the eradication of public participation was not only wrong-headed, but also counter-productive of the
long-term interests of the nuclear industry. 128 The Commission's ra123. See id. (testimony of Alan S. Rosenthal).
124. Public Participation in Nuclear Licensing, supra note 113, at 181 (testimony of
Anthony Roisman, representing the Citizens Association for Sound Energy).
125. See 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372 (1989).
126. See Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings-Procedural Changes in
the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168 (1989).
127. See Hearing on Nuclear Facility Standardization, supra note 118, at 83 (remarks of
Congressman Sieberling).
128. See id. at 104-05 (testimony of Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman of the NRC's Atomic
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tionale for its recent restructuring of the licensing process and revised
hearing procedures is examined more closely below. That examination
reveals little apparent wisdom in the Commission's preparation for a
hoped-for renewal in licensing activity, and suggests that the licensing
proceedings of the 1990s-if indeed there are any-are unlikely to be
any less contentious than those of the 1970s and 1980s.
1. The Restructured Licensing Process
It will be recalled that the central feature of the two-step licensing process developed by the AEC at the inception of the civilian
nuclear power program, and upheld by the Supreme Court in the
Power Reactor case, was the postponement of so-called "definitive"
safety findings by the Commission until its consideration of the issuance of an operating license at the second step of the review process.
Initially favored by the industry and the government in order to facilitate the development of a newly emerging technology, this feature
eventually came to haunt its sponsors. The second stage of regulatory
review lengthened the licensing process and kept its outcome unpredictable, even after construction of a nuclear power plant had been
completed. With construction costs for a typical facility having escalated from less than $200 million to more than $2 billion, licensing
delays and uncertainty became intolerable to investors, and the stream
of new orders for nuclear power plants in the United States dried up
even before the accident at Three Mile Island.
The main objective of the Commission's 1989 overhaul of its
licensing process was to cure this problem and recreate an attractive
environment for new utility investments in nuclear power. Accordingly, the central feature of the new licensing regime is an effort to
establish a "one-step" licensing process that resolves all issues material to licensing as early in the process as possible, ideally "before a
single shovel of dirt is turned."' 2 9 The regulations attempt to
achieve this objective in three ways. Subpart A of the regulations
provides for "early site permits" and allows utilities to secure NRC
approval of potential reactor sites even before ordering a plant. 3 '
Pre-approval of sites in this fashion would remain effective for ten

Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel and B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chief Administrative Judge of the
NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel).
129. See Hearings on Nuclear Facility Standardization, supra note 118, at 124 (testimony
of Howard B. Friend, Vice President, Bechtel Power Corp.).
130. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.11-52.39 (1991).
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years and would include a final determination of all site-specific
issues, including, for example, the potential for earthquakes and the
feasibility of evacuation, two issues that have proved nettlesome in
the past. Subpart B establishes procedures for plant design certification by rulemaking, thus facilitating plant standardization.13' Preapproval of reactor designs under this procedure would remain effective for fifteen years and, for this period, would essentially allow a
utility to order a new reactor "off the shelf," requiring very little
additional regulatory review. Subpart C provides for "combined licenses"-essentially a permit to construct and a conditional permit to
operate-which the NRC would issue after a public hearing. 32 This
combined license would not only authorize construction of a proposed
power plant, but would also specify the requirements for construction
and the test protocols for evaluating whether these requirements had
been met (so called "acceptance criteria"). Upon completion of construction and a further finding that construction satisfied the pre-specifled acceptance criteria, operation would be authorized. A post-construction (and pre-operation) hearing would be available to an interested party (a citizens' group, for instance) that wished to contest authorization to operate the plant, but only under two limited circumstances. If the intervenor contended simply that construction had not satisfied the acceptance criteria specified in the combined license, a hearing would be provided upon request to determine any "genuine issues
of material fact" presented.'33 Any other contention, however, would
be treated as a petition for a modification of the terms and conditions
of the combined license, which the Commission would address under
the enforcement regulations in 10 C.F.R. 2.206. These regulations do
not address the issue of a hearing, providing merely that the Commission would "consider the petition and determine whether any immediate action is required."' 34
Subpart C thus revises the existing licensing process in two
significant respects.' 35 First, by combining a construction permit
with an operating license, the Commission front-loaded the required
hearings. Issues in the past that were considered in operating license
hearings (at the second stage of the two-stage licensing process), such

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. §§ 52.41-52.63.
See id. §§ 52.71-52.103.
Id. § 52.103(b)(2)(i).
Id. § 52.103(b)(2)(ii).
Id. §§ 52.71-.103.
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as the adequacy of emergency preparedness plans 36 or whether "the
137
facility will be ... operated in conformity with the... Act,"
will now be considered at the combined license stage. Indeed, the
Commission acknowledged that it was the purpose of Subpart C to
"moveo the bulk of the issues up front in the licensing process ... ,I"38 Second, Subpart C alters the post-construction hearing
opportunity. The Commission is required to hold a hearing upon
request only with regard to issues concerning the conformity of the
plant with the acceptance criteria; all other issues are addressed
through a process in which
hearings, if any, are provided at the
39
Commission's discretion.
This last feature of Subpart C is the most controversial of the
new regulations. The industry is not entirely satisfied because the
potential for a contentious second-stage hearing has not been entirely
eliminated. In its view, the determination of whether a newly completed plant has been properly constructed should not be the subject
of hearings at all, but should be based on objective tests, standards
and criteria compliance with which could be ensured by inspectors
during construction.' 4 Anything short of a truly "one-step" licensing process, the industry insists, is 14simply not enough to create a
favorable climate for new investment.'
Nuclear opponents, on the other hand, are not entirely satisfied
either. In their view, hearings must be held before a newly constructed plant begins operation in order to ensure that it has been built as
designed and to treat other safety issues, such as emergency preparedness and readiness for operation, that could not ordinarily have been
examined earlier. 42 These objections became the basis of a petition
for review filed with the Court of Appeals in June of 1989 by a
coalition of public interest groups that challenged the new regulations
on the ground that the combined license authorized by Subpart C

136. See id. § 50.47.
137. See id. § 52.97(b).
138. See 54 Fed. Reg. at 15,374.
139. Id. at 15,373.
140. Id.
141. See Marshall Yates, Nuclear Licensing Reforms and Shoreham, 124 PUB. UTH
FORT. 6 (Aug. 3, 1989) (stating that an amendment that prohibited post-construction hearings
for plants that had been issued a combined license was added by the Subcommittee on
Energy and Power of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, with unanimous Republican support, to an NRC authorization measure in June, 1989, but that the full Committee
eventually stripped the provision from the bill).
142. Id.
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violated the Atomic Energy Act's requirements for a two-step hearing
process.
In Nuclear Information and Resource Service v. NRC, the Court
of Appeals granted the petition in part.143 Upholding the
Commission's authority to issue a combined license, the Court nevertheless concluded that the Subpart C regulations failed to provide a
sufficiently broad opportunity for post-construction hearings. 144 Under the regulations, a hearing after construction and prior to authorization for operation was available "upon request," but only to resolve
the issue of whether the plant had been constructed in conformity
with its combined license.145 This was too restrictive, the court
ruled, since the statute required the Commission to: (1) make postconstruction/pre-operation findings that go beyond the question of
whether the plant was constructed in conformity with its license and
(2) grant a "hearing upon request" to interested parties that wish to
contest any such findings. 46 The Commission was required, for instance, to find "that the plant will operate in conformity with the
Act," and it would be "inadequate," said the court, "[f]or the Commission to 'find' that a plant conforms with the Act simply because it
conforms with a license issued years earlier ....
The problem with this rationale, however, is that it rests upon an
implicit rejection of the major premise of the new regulations-namely, that reactor technology has matured to the point where
a "definitive" safety determination can be made in advance of construction. This position, of course, is precisely the reverse of that
148
taken by the Commission thirty years ago in the Power Reactor
case. The Commission insists, though, that there is no inconsistency
in this reversal because "times have changed, and .. . understanding
of nuclear technology has so evolved as to warrant a reformed regulatory regime." 149 On what basis could this "expert" determination of
the agency entrusted by Congress to regulate nuclear technology be
rejected? The Court of Appeals could offer only the following:
During the lengthy construction process, new and safety-significant

143. 918 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
144. Id at 196-97.
145. Id.

146.
147.
148.
367 U.S.
149.

Id.
Id at 196.
Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers,
396, 407-10 (1961).
Nuclear Information & Resource Serv. v. NRC, 918 F.2d 187, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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information about plant design, siting, or operation may arise. These
intervening developments may in turn raise new issues about the
conformity of the plant with the Act and thus about the propriety of
authorization. These developments might involve significant new
experiences with the plant design or operation, significant new information about site seismology or meteorology, or significant changes
in local population density or infrastructure. Such intervening developments could raise important and previously unconsidered issues
about the plant's conformity with the Act. 5 '
None of this conjecture about what "might" or "could" happen is
totally implausible. However, the point is that it is entirely conjecture
that places the Court of Appeals rather far out on a judicial limb.
There is evidence available, to be sure, that raises doubts about the
Commission's conclusion that reactor technology and construction
have "evolved" to the point where a "definitive" safety determination
can be made in advance of construction, subject only to confirmation
by inspection. The fiascos at Zimmer 5 ' and Diablo Canyon' 52 are
just two cases that come to mind. Whether this evidence is enough to
brand as "arbitrary and capricious" the Commission's conclusion that
new safety questions are not likely to arise during the period of reactor construction is fairly debatable. However, for the Court of Appeals to reject this conclusion and, indeed, to come to precisely the
opposite one, 5 3 without even having considered this or any other
evidence, is yet another example of the "judicial intervention run
riot," which the Supreme Court condemned in Vermont Yankee.""
In any event, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service
decision is not likely to provide more than a temporary setback to the
Commission's efforts to implement fully its licensing reforms. The
Agency's authority to issue a combined license was upheld, and the

150. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
151. See generally SAFETY SECOND, supra note 39, at 142-52 (explaining that NRC staff
investigators failed to detect a total breakdown in quality assurance, and that the plant was
cancelled in 1989 after its owners determined that they could not afford the necessary
rework, a total of $1.7 billion had been spent and the plant was described as 97% complete,
but it simply could not be proved that the plant was built as designed).
152. See generally id. at 152-56 (stating that the Commission discovered another total
breakdown in quality assurance only after having granted a low-power operating license). The
NRC eventually had to suspend the license and the subsequent quality assurance verification
program resulted in thousands of modifications to the design of the plant. Id.
153. Nuclear Information and Resource Serv., 918 F.2d at 196 (stating that "[s]ignificant
new information which surfaces during construction may raise new and material issues of a
plant's conformity with the Act.").
154. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRC, 435 U.S. 519, 557 (1978).
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Court of Appeals itself acknowledged that only minor revisions in
Subpart C were necessary to satisfy the hearing requirements of the
Atomic Energy Act. The proposed regulations had provided that even
after construction, "any person ... may request a hearing on the
basis ... that significant new information shows that some modification to the site or the design is necessary to assure adequate protection of public health and safety ... ,,.5 This proposal, the court
observed, "would appear to have satisfied the Commission's statutory
obligations ...., 156 In addition, the court noted that the Commission has always had "broad authority to define standards and thresholds for determining when new information raises a material issue of
It would thus appear
a plant's conformity with the Act ....
that the Commission retains considerable discretion to structure a licensing process that affords the public a decidedly narrower opportunity for post-construction intervention than that afforded by the former two-step process. There seems to be little reason to believe that
the Commission will not act quickly to put such a process into place.
If history is any guide, this will only stimulate further public opposition to licensing decisions. And so it goes.
"'7

2. The Revised Hearing Procedures
In August of 1989, a few months after the Commission replaced
its longstanding, two-step licensing process with the single-step process just discussed, it issued new regulations that substantially revised
its hearing procedures.15 ' The central thrust of the new rules was to
make intervention and participation in the Commission's licensing
proceedings more difficult, and it is not surprising, therefore, that the
new rules received "broad support" from the industry, while being
"generally opposed" by the public. 59 Their promulgation, notwithstanding this opposition, provides yet another indication of the
Commission's continuing hostility to public participation in its proceedings. Probably the most significant change made by the new rules
is the amendment to 10 C.F.R. 2.714, the rule governing the requirements for intervention in a licensing proceeding. To appreciate the

155. 53 Fed. Reg. 32,060 (1988) (codified at 10 C.F.R. 52 (1991)).
156. Nuclear Informnation and Resource Serv., 918 F.2d at 195 n.11.
157. Id. at 195.
158. Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings-Procedural Changes in the
Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168 (1989) [hereinafter Rules of Practice); see also Union
of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (upholding the new rules).
159. Id.
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impact of the new rule on the public's statutory right to participate in
licensing proceedings, it is necessary to understand the NRC's process
for reviewing licensing applications.
a.

The Licensing Process

Upon receipt of an application for a construction permit or an
operating license, the NRC staff begins a detailed review of the application for compliance with the Commission's regulations."6° The review focuses on the contents of the multi-volume application, but also
entails a give-and-take exchange with the applicant involving numerous meetings and extensive correspondence. In the course of this
review, the application is changed and supplemented many times. The
results of the staff's review are reported in its Safety Evaluation
Report (hereinafter "SER"). The SER discusses the staff's rationale
for approving the application, and addresses every aspect of reactor
safety covered by the Commission's regulations. The SER also describes those features of the proposed plant's design that were modified by the applicant, that require additional information, that will be
resolved in the future, or that remain unresolved, as well as those
features of the plant's design or the applicant's programs that deviate
from the NRC's licensing criteria.' 6 ' Separately, as required by the
National Environmental Policy Act, the staff also publishes an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS") regarding the proposed issuance of a construction permit or operating license. Like the
SER, the EIS contains the staff's rationale for finding that the legal
requirements for licensing have been met. 62
When a license application is docketed by the NRC, and long
before the staff's SER is prepared and made public, a notice of hearing, or opportunity to request a hearing, is published in the Federal
Register. 63 Interested parties must generally file a petition to intervene in the proceeding no later than the time specified in the notice

160. See UNITED STATES NRC, STANDARD REVIEW PLAN FOR THE REVIEW OF SAFETY
ANALYSIS REPORTS FOR NUcLEAR POWER PLANTs, (NUREG-0800 1987) (stating that the
staff's review is governed by internal agency procedures and guidelines that are contained in
a three-volume treatise known as the Standard Review Plan).
161. See Id. at 3.
162, See 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.91, 51.95, 51.102, 51.103 (1991).
163, Under section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(i)
(1991)), hearings must be held on an application for a construction permit regardless of
whether they are requested by any other party. On an application for an operating license, or
a license amendment, hearings are required only when requested by an interested person.
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of the hearing, or as otherwise provided.' 64 An Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board (hereinafter "Licensing Board") is then convened for
the purpose of considering petitions to intervene and conducting any
necessary hearings. The Licensing Board schedules a "special
prehearing conference" to be held approximately 90 days after the
notice of hearing. The purpose of this conference is to identify the
key. issues to be litigated in the hearing. 6 5 Fifteen days before the
prehearing conference, each prospective intervenor must file a supplement to its petition to intervene that includes "a list of the 66contentions which petitioner seeks to have litigated in the hearing."'
Thus, prospective intervenors must prepare and file their contentions on the license application while the NRC staff is conducting its
own review of the license application. Moreover, because the staff's
review is detailed and time consuming, the SER and EIS documents
are virtually never available to intervenors before the deadline for
filing contentions. In fact, these documents typically take well over a
year to prepare. 67 SERs may also be issued in partial installments
spanning a number of years; as the staff collects sufficient information from the applicant in order to resolve its concerns about the
sufficiency of discrete aspects of the application, it publishes its resolutions in "supplements" to the SER. As the staff conducts its review,
the license application also changes many times as new information is
submitted in order to address the staff's concerns. Thus, at the deadline for filing contentions, proposed intervenors are rarely in possession of either a completed license application or of the staff's rationale for recommending approval of the application.
During hearings before the Licensing Board, the staff takes the
role of a party in the litigation. With the burden of proof upon the
license applicant, the Board is required to weigh the evidence of all
parties without deference to the staff. 6 Nevertheless, as a practical
matter, the Board relies on the staff "for an evaluation of contested
issues, especially technical ones."' 69 With respect to uncontested is164. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a) (1991).
165. Id. § 2.751(a).
166. Id. § 2.714(b)(1).
167. B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Nuclear Licensing: Innovation Through Evolution in Adininistraive Hearings, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. 497, 504 n.32 (1982) (noting that since the Three Mile
Island accident in 1979, in operating license proceedings in which licensing boards were
appointed, preparation of SERs averaged 17 months, and preparation of EISs averaged 19
months).
168. 10 C.F.R. Pt. 2, App. A, § V(d) (1991); see also 10 C.F.R. § 2.732 (1991).
169. In re Louisiana Power & Light Co., 22 N.R.C. 5, 56 (1985).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:159

sues in construction permit cases, the Licensing Board is "neither required nor expected to duplicate" the staff's review, but instead is
"authorized to rely upon the testimony of the staff, the applicant, and
the conclusions of the ACRS [Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards]."' 70 In an operating license case, the Licensing Board simply refers uncontested issues to the staff for resolution.17 1 Accordingly, except with respect to contested issues, the Licensing Board
does not perform a de novo review of a license application. Rather, it
relies on the staff's assessment of whether the application meets the
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. Unless an issue is successfully introduced into a
hearing by an intervenor, it will be evaluated and disposed of in the
course of the NRC staff's review, without further opportunity for
hearing or comment.
b. The New Rule
Under the former, longstanding practice, a petition to intervene
had to be supported by a "list of contentions" setting forth "the basis
for each contention with reasonable particularity."' 72 This was construed, essentially, as a "notice pleading" requirement, and little supporting detail was insisted upon. The revised rule continues to require
this "list of contentions," but in addition requires that each such contention must be supported by:
1.

an "explanation";

2. "a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinions" that support the contention, together with an identification of the "sources and documents" on which the petitioner
will rely in order to establish those facts or opinions; and
3. enough information to "show" the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, which must include references to
those portions of the application that the petitioner dis-

170. 10 C.F.R. Pt. 2, App. A, § V(f)(1), (2) (1991).
171. See In re South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 13 N.R.C. 881, 895-96 (1981), aff'd sub
norn. Fairfield United Action v. NRC, 679 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Union Electric
Co., 18 N.R.C. 1205, 1216-17 (1983).
172. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(b) (1989); see also Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920
F.2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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73

putes. 1

These new requirements obviously go well beyond "notice pleading;"
indeed, they would appear to go beyond the "fact pleading" requirements of the codes as well. Petitioners must not only plead "facts,"
but they must plead their "evidence"-enough evidence to demonstrate a "triable" issue-and they must do so shortly after the application has been filed, before discovery, and before the staff issues its
SER and EIS, the two most significant documents in a license proceeding.
The Commission acknowledged that the new rule would "raise
the threshold for the admission of contentions," 74 and conceded that
those who supported it did so because, in their view, it would have
"the salutary effect of requiring petitioners to know in advance of
filing a petition to intervene what issues they intended to litigate and
how they planned to conduct the litigation." 175 Nevertheless, the
Commission disputed the assertion, made by those who were opposed
to the rule, that it would unduly burden the right to a hearing, which
is provided by section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, to "any
person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding."' 76 It
elaborated as follows:
The Commission does not agree that this rule contravenes
section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. A
member of the public has no absolute or unconditional right to
intervene in a nuclear power plant licensing proceeding under the
Atomic Energy Act .... Section 189a of the Act which provides
for intervention is subject to the Commission's rulemaking power
under section 161p and, thus, to reasonable procedural requirements
designed to further the purposes of the Act ....

Furthermore, the

173. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(b)(2) (1991).
174. Rules of Practice, supra note 158, at 33,168. The Commission also noted, more
specifically, that the revised rule would overturn the holdings of two cases in which
[t]he Appeal Board found . . . that the current language of 10 C.F.R. 2.714 does
not require a petition to describe facts which would be offered in support of a
proposed contention. The new rule will require that a petitioner include in its submission some alleged fact or facts in support of its position sufficient to indicate
that a genuine issue of material fact or law exists.
Id at 33,170. In upholding the new rule the Court of Appeals acknowledged that it perceptibly heightens the pleading standard for intervenors. See Union of Concerned Scientists, 920
F.2d at 52 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
175. Rules of Practice, supra note 158, at 33,169 (emphasis added).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1) (Supp. 1991).
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right to intervention under section 189a for a member of the public
is explicitly conditioned upon a "request." The proposed amendments would, in effect, provide that a "proper request" by a member of the public shall include a statement of the facts supporting
each contention together with references to the sources and documents on which the intervenor relies to establish those facts.'"
This is an argument that reeks of legalisms. That a hearing could be
denied in instances where there was no "request" for one hardly
seems to justify, in instances where there was a request, the imposition of an "Alice-in-Wonderland" procedural burden that requires
prospective intervenors to produce their proof in order to be admitted
to the proof gathering process. The Commission's argument also
seems plainly disingenuous. Its general rulemaking power to promulgate "reasonable procedural requirements" obviously does not permit
the Commission to prescribe requirements that are "unreasonable."
What could be more unreasonable, asked the opponents of the new
rule, than procedures that operate to nullify the right to a hearing
granted by the statute by raising the threshold78for the admissability of
contentions to a level that could not be met?
The Commission also brushed aside objections that its new rule
was "unfair" because it required intervenors to come forward with
evidence to support their contentions before any opportunity to conduct discovery and before publication of the staff's SER and EIS. For
"[s]everal months before contentions are filed," the Commission noted, the applicant's multi-volume safety and environmental reports will
have been "available for public inspection and copying in the
Commission's headquarters and local public document rooms. ',179
There was thus no "unfairness," said the Commission, in declining to
authorize the use of discovery as a "fishing expedition."' 80 Nor was
it unfair, the Commission asserted, to require prospective intervenors
to come forward with their case in advance of the availability of the
staff's SER since, "[w]ith the exception of NEPA issues, the sole
focus of the hearing is on whether the application satisfies NRC

177. Rules of Practice, supra note 158, at 33,170 (citations omitted).
178. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied sub noin. Arkansas Power and Light Co. v. Union of Concerned Scientists, 469 U.S.
1132 (1985) (holding that, while the Commission possesses the -discretion" to structure its li-

censing hearings "in the interests of speed and efficiency," !d, at 1448, this discretion does
not permit it to deny "meaningful public participation," id. at 1446).
179. Rules of Practice, supra note 158, at 33,170-71.
180. Id.
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regulatory requirements, rather than the adequacy of the NRC staff
18
performance."'
Of course, these contentions conveniently ignore the fact that the
application itself is far from complete when first filed, and the fact
that much of the detailed data that eventually will be relied upon to
support the application is developed by the staff in the course of its
regulatory review and presented coherently for the first time in the
SER." 2 In addition, the assertion that "the application," rather than
"the adequacy of the NRC staff performance," is the "sole focus" of
the licensing hearing is simply not true, for two reasons. First, the
assertion is not true as a practical matter. Since the staff appears at
the hearing as a proponent of the license, its position and that of the
applicant are so closely aligned that, from the public's perspective,
the adequacy of the application and the adequacy of staff review of
the application are two issues that cannot be separated. Second, the
assertion is not true as a legal matter. Commission decisions to issue
a reactor license are based, to a considerable degree, on the staff's
conclusion that all NRC regulatory requirements have been satisfied. I" 3 Whether the staff's conclusions are supported by an adequate review would thus seem to be a material issue in licensing
proceedings, and a legitimate target of intervenor contentions."
The Commission's stubborn refusal to acknowledge the propriety
of challenges to the adequacy of the staff's review of the license
application may, perhaps, reflect an understandable solicitude for its
staff's position. The staff comes to high-visibility hearings only after
its thorough but low-visibility review of the application has enabled it

181. Id.
182. See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text; see also Union of Concerned
Scientists v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that "whether
the proceeding is uncontested or contested [the Licensing Board's] mandate is to review the
sufficiency of the record . . . ." Id, at 1077. "The role of the ASLB is not to compile a
record; it is to review a record already compiled by the Staff and the ACRS ....
Id. at
1077-78.).
184. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied sub noin. Arkansas Power and Light Co. v. Union of Concerned Scientists, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985) (holding that a hearing required by section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy
Act extends to all issues material to licensing decision). The Court of Appeals appeared to
disagree. It saw the staff's SER only as a "pre-complaint discovery tool," potentially relevant
to a contention aimed at the sufficiency of the application, rather than at the adequacy of the
staff's review. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F.2d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Seen in this light, the new rule operated not to exclude a new "issue" from licensing hearings, but to exclude only new "evidence" on an old issue. Id. at 54-56.
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to conclude that all regulatory requirements have been satisfied. 8 If
an intervenor contends otherwise, the staff's defense of its own positions during regulatory review now appears to be a defense of the
applicant's positions-inviting the public to conclude that the staff is
simply an apologist for the applicant. This appearance of partiality
could be avoided either by formalizing the staff's preheating review
of the application or by relieving the staff of the responsibility to
appear as a party in licensing hearings; however, neither of these
approaches seems very practical. Formalization of the staff's review
of the application, turning it into a sort of "on the record" investigation, would obviously be inefficient, given the complexity of the
application review process.186 Relieving the staff of its role as a
party in licensing proceedings, on the other hand, would deprive Licensing Boards of their one source of comprehensive expertise, and
would thereby turn those proceedings into little more than an exercise
for the rubber stamping of an application.
Under these circumstances, the new rule can perhaps be seen as
an effort by the Commission to steer an in-between course. The
staff's role as a party in licensing proceedings is preserved, but. the
staff's need to defend the conclusions of its safety review is eliminated by the requirement that all intervenor contentions be targeted at
the application, before the staff's review is concluded. Even if viewed
in this light, however, the best that can be said for the new rule is
that it is an exercise in wishful thinking. One of the most obvious
lessons learned from the history of reactor licensing is that the
public's doubts about reactor safety are linked to its doubts about the
integrity of the staff's safety review; recall Justice Douglas' observation about "white elephants" in his dissent in Power Reactor. Whether
or not these doubts are well founded, they cannot be dispelled by
being ignored. Thus, it makes little sense, if any, for the Commission
to continue to pretend that the adequacy of the NRC staff performance is not an issue in licensing proceedings.
This continued pretense, coupled with a higher threshold in general for the admissability of contentions in licensing hearings, is sure
to exacerbate any lingering distrust of NRC regulation. Prospects for
"6more efficient" licensing in the 1990s, which is the stated goal of
the new regulations, seem rather dim.

185. See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
186. See Id.
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B. Monitoring On-Line Reactors
From the very beginning of the civilian nuclear power program,
the Commission, first as the AEC and, after 1974, as the NRC, has
been primarily concerned with the licensing of new reactors. Even
after the flow of new orders dried up, and the first wave of reactor
licensing came to an end with the accident at Three Mile Island, the
Commission remained preoccupied with the issuance of construction
permits and operating licenses for those nuclear plants that remained
in the licensing pipeline." 7 For the present, this regulatory focus
has changed. There are currently about one hundred thirteen reactors
in commercial operation and fewer than a handful in initial licensing.
Accordingly, the Commission has begun to pay increased attention to
the problems of ensuring continued safety at on-line reactors.' 88
These problems are formidable. They require attention to an
enormous range of risks, from human error to catastrophic equipment
failure. The latter is of increasing concern. The earliest licensed plants
are now thirty years old, and the effects of aging on the miles of
piping in a plant, and even on major components of the nuclear
steam supply system such as the reactor pressure vessel itself, are
largely unknown.8 9 The one-of-a-kind design of U.S. reactors only
compounds the complexities of maintaining safety margins at reactors
throughout the country, and the NRC itself has acknowledged that the
risk of a meltdown at a U.S. plant is not insignificant."9 Needless
to say, the public retains a vital interest in the many "safety" determinations now being made by the NRC in the context of its day-today supervision of on-line reactors. The Commission, however, has
erected a series of barriers to public participation in its enforcement
program, which, collectively, have virtually put an end to any public
involvement in the Commission's decisions.

187. See generally SAFETY SECOND, supra note 39.
188. See, e.g., Ensuring the Effectiveness of Maintenance Programs for Nuclear Power
Plants, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,822 (1988) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed rule requiring
licensees to strengthen their maintenance activities).
189. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, A-Plant Closure Urged Over Safety of a Weld, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1991, at A25 (reporting that activists urged the closing of Yankee Rowe, a
31-year-old nuclear power plant, because the metal structures had become brittle); see also
Robert Smock, Aging Nuclear Power Fleet Faces New Regulatory Challenges, 92 POWER

ENGINEERING 27-32 (1988) (discussing the problems surrounding aging nuclear power plants).
190. See UNITED STATES NRC, I SEVERE ACCIDENT RISKS: AN ASSESSMENT FOR FIVE
U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (NUREG- 150 1990).
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Under the Commission's regulations, enforcement action can be
initiated against a licensee only by the Commission. Members of the
public can, however, request that enforcement be undertaken.' 91 In
either case, though, the public is frozen out of the process.
1. Commission-Initiated Enforcement
The Atomic Energy Act confers broad enforcement authority on
the Commission, which it may choose to exercise by issuing administrative orders to licensees (including orders revoking, suspending or
modifying a license), by imposing civil penalties administratively, or
by seeking appropriate civil or criminal sanctions through the
courts. 192 In the vast majority of cases, the Commission deals with
licensee violations of regulatory requirements by assessing a civil
penalty. In such cases, the appropriate NRC Office Director "initiates
the civil penalty process by issuing a notice of violation," with a proposed penalty. 93 "The licensee is provided an opportunity to contest
in writing the proposed imposition of a civil penalty. After evaluation
of the licensee's response, the Director may mitigate, remit or impose
the civil penalty. An opportunity is provided for a hearing if a civil
penalty is imposed."'' 94 In practice, however, proposed penalties are
ordinarily accepted at this stage. Since this procedure does not involve any "proceeding . . . for the granting, suspending, revoking, or
amending of any license," as provided by section 189(a) of the
Atomic Energy Act, no right to a public "hearing" under that section
is implicated.
In more serious cases, the Commission may propose a license
modification.' 95 Such a proposal evidently constitutes a "proceeding . . . for the amending of a license" within the meaning of Section
189(a),196 and therefore, the Commission must "grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the

191. See supra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
192. See General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions, 10
C.F.R. Ch. 1, Pt. 2, App. C (1991).
193. Id. at II.B.
194. Id.
195. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.204 (1991). The procedure for issuing an order to show cause
why a license should not be modified is set forth at 10 C.F.R. section 2.202. The NRC is
also authorized to make the modification order effective immediately. 10 C.F.R. § 2.204
(1991).
196. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 745 n.l1 (1985) (stating that a
petition for order to show cause under 10 C.F.R. section 2.206 initiates a "proceeding" within
the meaning of section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act).
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proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding." 197
Accordingly, the Commission's regulations provide the affected
licensee with an opportunity for a hearing. However, they do not
provide an opportunity for a hearing to members of the public, even
to those who live within the vicinity of the plant in question or to
those whose interests in health and safety are undisputably "affected"
by the plant's continued operation. At first blush, such a distinction
may seem hard to square with the command of the statute, which
provides a right to a hearing to "any person whose interest may be
affected," especially when it has been acknowledged that this hearing
was intended by Congress to serve the "vital function... [of] . . .
obtaining public confidence in the licensing process. ... "'9' Nevertheless, it was upheld in Bellotti v. NRC 1' on the basis of an
extraordinarily narrow definition of the scope of its enforcement proceedings, which the Commission adopted apparently to prevent the
public from being able to participate.2" Bellotti deserves some elaboration because it reveals the unflagging commitment of the Commission to the elimination of public participation in any of its proceedings.
The NRC had discovered serious deficiencies in the Boston Edison Company's management of its Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,
which posed a threat to the safety of residents in the plant's vicinity.
Accordingly, the Commission issued an "Order Modifying License,"
effective immediately because of the threat, amending Boston
Edison's license to require that the utility submit a comprehensive
plan of action that would redress the total "breakdowns in Boston
Edison Company's management controls ....
In addition to ordering this license amendment, the NRC imposed civil penalties of
$550,500 on the utility, the largest such penalty ever levied by the
Commission up to that time.2 02 "In its Order Modifying License
[the Commission] offered to provide a hearing to the licensee, if
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (Supp. 1991).
198. H.R. REP. No. 22, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2 at 11 (1982) (emphasis added).
199. 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
200. This was the view of the two Commissioners who dissented from the Commission's
adoption of its "non-intervention" policy. See In re Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 12 N.R.C.
547, 549-50 (dissenting view of Commissioner Bradford with Commissioner Gilinsky concurring).
201. Bellotti, 725 F.2d at 1384 (Wright, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (citing brief for petitioner at 3). See Pete Earley, No Warning Systems, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 1982, at A21.
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requested, on the issue of whether the Order should be sustained. It
offered no hearing to anyone other than the licensee.""2 3 When the
licensee declined to request a hearing, the Attorney General of Massachusetts petitioned to intervene and requested a hearing under section
189(a) on the adequacy of the licensee's plan to protect the health
and safety interests of the residents of Massachusetts." 4
The Commission denied the petition on the ground that there
was no right to a hearing, because no Massachusetts resident had an
interest that could be affected by the proceeding, the condition laid
down by section 189(a) for the right to intervene.20 5 This was so,
the Commission concluded, because "the proceeding" would address
only one issue: whether the Order Modifying License should be sustained. If it was sustained, then the remedial plan of action that it
required the licensee to submit for NRC approval would be developed
outside the proceeding. Under this narrow definition of the scope of
"the proceeding," the only possible intervenors would be those who
thought the proposed Order should not be sustained. As a practical
matter, this means that the only "person" with standing to intervene
in a Commission enforcement proceeding will be the licensee, who
may assert that the proposed enforcement Order goes too far; members of the public may not assert that it does not go far enough.
While their health and safety interests are undeniably "affected" by
the operation of the nuclear plant, they are not "affected" by "the
proceeding." By this "semantic sleight of hand" 2' the Commission
acquired the power to wholly foreclose all public participation in its
enforcement proceedings.
Judge Bork, writing for the 2-1 majority of the Court of Appeals
panel that upheld the Commission's action as an exercise of its "authority to structure and control section 189(a) proceedings, 2 7 disputed this contention. The opportunity for the public to challenge the
adequacy of the Commission's enforcement decisions was preserved,
he said, by two options. First, interested members of the public who
believed that an enforcement action did not go far enough to protect
their health and safety-the petitioners in Bellotti-were entitled, under the Commission's regulations, to petition the Commission to take

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Bellottl, 725 F.2d at 1385 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Id
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
Bellotti, 725 F.2d at 1386 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1383.
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additional enforcement action.20 8 Such a petition was "not a futile
gesture," 21 the majority declared, since denials were "subject to judicial review" under the traditional "'arbitrary and capricious' standard," thus "ensur[ing] that only serious issues need be addressed." 210 This assessment of the efficacy of public-initiated enforcement actions, as an antidote for inadequate enforcement by the
Commission, has proved to be wrong, primarily because of the
majority's failure to anticipate the subsequent decision of the Supreme
Court in Heckler v. Chaney," which enunciated a presumption
against the "reviewability" of agency exercises of enforcement discretion. As is more fully discussed below, all public requests for enforcement action-so-called 2.206 petitions-are routinely denied,
without hearings, and without judicial review.
Second, the majority denied that its holding would end "all"
public participation. 212 "The Commission's power to define the
scope of a proceeding," it wrote, "will lead to the denial of intervention... only when the Commission is seeking to make a facility's
operation safer."21 Where by contrast, the Commission was proposing actions that were potentially less safe-by proposing to relieve the
licensee of a license restriction-then "the scope of the proceeding is
defined by that proposal and section 189(a) permits public participa'
This assertion, that public particition to oppose that relaxation."214
pation remained "automatic with respect to all Commission actions
that are potentially hanful to the public health and welfare," 215 has
also proved to be just plain wrong. This time, however, the majority's
premise was undermined not by subsequent judicial decisions, but by
yet another technique developed by the Commission for avoiding
public participation in its licensing proceedings, the so-called "Sholly
Rule."
In 1980, the NRC allowed the operator of the Three Mile Island
plant, General Public Utilities (hereinafter "GPU"), to vent radioactive
krypton gas trapped inside the reactor building of the damaged plant.
The procedure violated a term of GPU's license that restricted the

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (1991).
Bellotti, 725 F.2d at 1383.
Id. at 1382-83.
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
Bellotti, 725 F.2d at 1383.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1383-84.
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gaseous releases of radionuclides, but the Commission had concluded
that no prior public hearing was necessary because the release posed
no risk to the public. In Sholly v. NRC, 1 6 the Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that, since a license "amendment" was involved, section
189(a) required that the Commission provide the opportunity for a
public hearing. The NRC appealed to Congress, objecting that the
court's ruling would require a hearing to be held before even the
most trivial license amendments that are insignificant from a public
health and safety standpoint. Congress responded to this concern in
1982 by amending section 189 to allow the NRC to modify operating
licenses without providing an opportunity for a prior public hearing if
the amendment involved "no significant hazards consideration. "217
At the same time, Congress made clear its intent that the "Sholly
Amendment," as this amendment had come to be known, was not to
be abused. The NRC was instructed that it must "draw a clear distinction" between those license amendments that present significant
hazards considerations and those that do not, that the amendment was
not to be used in "doubtful or borderline cases," and that, in all cases, the question of a right to a prior hearing was to turn on whether
a license amendment presented significant hazards considerations-not
whether it posed significant hazards." 8
In May of 1983, the Commission issued a rule implementing its
new authority under the Sholly Amendment. 9 The "Sholly Rule,"
however, fell far short of satisfying the Congressional specifications.
The distinction between license amendments that pose significant
hazards considerations and those that do not was far from clear or
readily made. Indeed, it was drawn in such imprecise and complex
terms that its application not only gave the staff enormous discretion,
but invited it to. go beyond the threshold question of whether the
license amendment posed significant safety questions and to address
those questions on the merits. Abuse of the Sholly Amendment by
the NRC staff has since become legion.220 Hundreds of license
amendments-more than ninety-eight percent of those proposed during
the period covered by one study22-are approved every year with-

216. 651 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded per curiam, 459 U.S. 1194
(1983).
217. Pub. L. No. 97-415, 96 Stat. 2073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1991)).
218.
219,

See H.R. REP. No. 97-884, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1982).
See 10 C.F.R. § 50.92 (1991).

220. See generally SAFETY SECOND, supra note 39, at 99-105.
221. Id. at 99.
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out prior hearings. Most of these amendments are indeed trivial.
Some, however, clearly pose significant safety issues. These, too, are
resolved without prior hearings.' m Thus, Judge Bork's assertion in
Bellotti, that public participation remains "automatic" with respect to
all Commission decisions that relax license restrictions, rings hollow.
Bellotti, together with the Sholly Rule, have, as Judge Skelly Wright
observed, "wholly exclude[d] non-discretionary public participation" in
2
Commission enforcement proceedings. n
2. Public-Initiated Enforcement
Commission regulations provide the public with a means for
attempting to stimulate enforcement action in cases in which the
Commission has not taken any enforcement initiative. Section 2.206
of the Commission's rules of practice provides that "[a]ny person
may file a request [for the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation] to
institute a proceeding pursuant to [10 C.F.R.] § 2.202 to modify,
suspend, or revoke a license, or for such other action as may be
224
proper.
The rule also requires the Director, within a reasonable time after
receiving such a request, either to institute the requested proceeding
by serving an order to show cause upon the licensee, 225 or to pro226
vide a written explanation of the decision to deny the request.
Unfortunately, although the existence of the 2.206 petition process
would appear, in theory, to create an opportunity for at least some
degree of public participation in the Commission's ongoing supervision of license operations, in practice it does not. There is no right to
a hearing of any sort on 2.206 requests and they are invariably denied, albeit with an explanation." 7 However, these explanations
need not be reasonable. In fact, under the principle announced by the
Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney,228 denials of 2.206 petitions
have recently been held to be agency action committed to agency
discretion and, hence, not subject to judicial review. 229 The filing of
222. Id
223. Bellotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wright, J.,dissenting).
224. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (1991).
225. Id. § 2.202.
226. Id § 2.206(b).
227, The author reviewed 38 cases in which members of the public filed 2.206 petitions
seeking show-cause enforcement action for the modification, suspension or revocation of an
on-line nuclear plant during the period from June 30, 1981 to September 30, 1986. In each
case the petition was denied without a hearing.
228.

470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985).

229. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516 (Ist Cir. 1989); Arnow v. NRC
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a 2.206 petition would thus appear to be the very "futile gesture" that
Judge Bork said it was not.23
The total exclusion of the public from the decisional processes of
the Commission in the context of enforcement seems particularly
shocking in light of the Commission's long-standing practice of issuing operating licenses notwithstanding the presence of "unresolved
safety issues."' 3 Many of the safety issues that the Commission has
been requested to address by the 2.206 petition process are precisely
those issues that the Commission failed to address in earlier licensing
proceedings. To permit the Commission to resolve them in the context of enforcement, without hearings and without judicial review,
invites the Commission to avoid the public hearing requirements of
section 189(a), which are central to the nuclear licensing process
envisioned by Congress.
The Commission's treatment of the Mark I containment problem
provides a notable example. All commercial reactors in the U.S. are
equipped with containment systems that are intended to prevent the
release to the environment of deadly, radioactive material that might
escape from the reactor core during an accident. 2 These systems
employ one of two basic strategies for dealing with a loss of coolant
accident (hereinafter "LOCA"), the most severe accident that a nuclear power plant is designed to withstand. 3 Since a LOCA would be
caused by the rupture of a pipe, releasing large amounts of high
temperature steam into the containment structure, the containment
structure is designed either to condense the steam, thereby limiting
the pressure rise in the structure, or to withstand that pressure by
brute strength. 21 The first design is referred to as a pressure-sup-

868 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub no,. Citizens of Illinois v. NRC, 493 U.S.
813 (1989); In re Three Mile Island Alert, Inc., 771 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied
sub not. Aamodt V. NRC, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v.
NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g en bane on other grounds, 789 F.2d 26
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
Prior to Heckler, the Second Circuit had impliedly held otherwise. County of Rockland
v. NRC, 709 F.2d 766 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993 (1983) (upholding, on the
merits, the denial of a 2.206 petition requesting enforcement action to correct alleged deficiencies in emergency preparedness).
230. Bellotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
231. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
232.

See generally ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER

REACTORS, 1-22 (WASH-1250 1973) (describing primary and secondary containment systems).
233. Id. at 166.
234.

See generally UNION

OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,

NUCLEAR REACTOR CONTAIN-

MENTS: SIEVE OR SHIELD (1987) (discussing general design criteria for containment systems

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/4

48

Goldsmith: Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear Power
1991]

REGULATORY REFORM

pression containment, and the second as a large, dry containment.
Pressure-suppression containments are used in thirty-nine reactors
manufactured by General Electric (hereinafter "GE") and ten by Westinghouse.235 An advantage of the pressure suppression design is that
a smaller, cheaper containment can be used.
The earliest GE containment, known as the Mark I, is currently
in use in twenty-four operating reactors.2 36 The volume of the Mark
I containment is about one-tenth that of most large, dry containments.
Questions about its basic design safety were raised in the early 1970s.
In 1972, because of the safety disadvantages of pressure-suppression
containments, AEC safety official Dr. Stephen Hanauer recommended
that "the AEC adopt a policy of discouraging further use of pressuresuppression containments, and that such designs not be accepted for
construction permits filed two years after the policy would be adopted." 237 This recommendation was not accepted by the Agency's top
policy-makers, who feared that a public reversal of the Agency's
policy on containment design "could well be the end of nuclear
power." 38 Hanauer's concerns had not been resolved during the licensing of the individual plants that employed pressure-suppression
because they had raised issues that had been labeled as
containments
"generic. 2 39 Hanauer's memo did, however, prompt a further safety
review by the staff, which concluded in 1978 that adequate safety
margins were being maintained in plants using the Mark I containment. 24" Less than one year later, the accident at Three Mile Island
raised additional questions about the ability of the Mark I containment to withstand a severe accident-an accident involving core damage more serious than that previously postulated by the design basis
accident. As a result of its own study, the NRC staff determined that
the failure probability for the Mark I containment following a core
meltdown accident ranged from ten to ninety percent.24 Nonetheless, because of the very small likelihood of such an event, the staff

and the
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

different types found in the United States).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

240. UNITED STATES NRC, A TECHNICAL UPDATE ON PRESSURE SUPPRESSION TYPE CONTAINMENTS IN USE IN LIGHT WATER REACTORS AND NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (NUREG0474 1978).
241. UNITED STATES NRC, I SEVERE ACCIDENT RISKS: AN ASSESSMENT FOR FIVE U.S.

NUCLEAR PowER PLANTS 8-2 (NUREG-1150 1990).
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concluded that no new regulatory requirements were justified.242
This conclusion was not particularly reassuring, and a number of
2.206 petitions were filed by members of the public who lived in the
vicinity of nuclear plants that had Mark I containments. These petitions requested the Commission to impose operating restrictions on
the plants in question, pending verification of the integrity of the
Mark I containment. Each petition was denied. Explanations that
accompanied the denials generally explained that the integrity of the
Mark I containment had been established, but that further evaluations
of the containment with respect to severe accidents were continuing.
To date, these studies had led to the conclusion that, with the exception of one design improvement that the staff had been directed to
approve, if initiated by a licensee, the need for further improvements
was to be evaluated on a plant-specific basis, by the licensees themselves. In the meantime, there was "reasonable assurance" that the
reactors in question could be operated without "undue risk" to the
health and safety of the public while further risk reduction measures
were being considered.243
To some, the explanation-"there is no problem but we are
working on it"-may seem a bit glib. It may seem even more so in
particular cases, where plant-specific problems were present in addition to the generic design defects inherent in the Mark I containment.
Thus, for example, a 2.206 petition seeking operational restrictions at
a Mark I plant was recently denied even though the plant was one of
only nine reactors on the NRC's "watch list" of problem plants that
required increased monitoring. The Commission denied the petition
despite the fact that the walls of the reactor's torus shell-a component of its containment system-had corroded to within .005 inches
of the required minimum thickness, and even though the rate of future corrosion was uncertain. 244 According to the staff, reasonable
assurances remained that operation at full power posed no undue risk,
since the licensee had "committed to the NRC245to perform wall thickness measurements at least every six months."
The point, of course, is not that the Mark I containment is not
safe enough. This is for the NRC to determine, relying on expert

242. Id.
243. See, e.g., fi re Boston Edison Co., 30 N.R.C. 791 (1989) (denying a 2.206 petition
that requested that the NRC fix or close all nuclear power reactors designed by GE).
244. In re Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 33 N.R.C. 279 (1991).
245. See NRC Staff Response to Specific Questions, enclosed with letter from NRC
Chairman Kenneth M. Carr to Rosemary S. Pooler (June 21, 1990) (on file with author).
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engineering and scientific judgment. It is clear, however, that this
determination has never been made by the process that Congress
envisioned. The adequacy of the Mark I containment, as well as a
myriad of other important "safety" determinations, are today being
made by the NRC behind closed doors, without public participation or
public scrutiny. Thus, there is little reason to expect that the public
will have confidence in them. The NRC has recently, if reluctantly,
promulgated a new rule, which requires that all operating reactors be
backfitted with improved technology, regardless of costs, whenever
this is necessary to insure that the facility provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.246 If this important substantive commitment to the continuing safe operation of previously licensed reactors is to be credible, however, the Commission must
make a procedural commitment to a decisional process in which the
public can participate.
CONCLUSION

Public participation in nuclear licensing proceedings has been the
subject of continuing controversy since the early years of the civilian
nuclear power program. While Congress had envisioned public hearings as an important instrument for eliciting public confidence in
nuclear power, the hearing process developed and implemented by the
ABC provided such an inadequate forum for addressing the public's
concerns that the Agency itself came under attack. Concerns about
nuclear safety were transformed into concerns about the integrity of
nuclear regulation. As the distrust of regulation grew, the clamor for
more public participation in regulation grew with it. In short, the
subject of public participation in nuclear licensing became one of
great symbolic significance.
The current debate, carried on in purely instrumental terms, about
whether public participation in nuclear regulation is good or bad thus
misses the point.247 Whether public interventions have increased the
costs of nuclear construction by more or less than the benefits derived
from their contributions to increased safety is simply immaterial. The

246. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(4)(ii) (1991). The backfit rule was issued on June 6,
1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,603-604 (1988), after the D.C. Circuit had vacated a prior version of
the rule, which had permitted costs to be taken into account. See Union of Concerned
Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The new rule was upheld in Union of
Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 880 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
247. See, e.g., Public Participationin Nuclear Licensing, supra note 113, at 77.
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need for meaningful public participation in nuclear regulation is a
political reality even if it is entirely "delusional," as one of its most
thoughtful critics has charged." The nuclear industry has acknowledged this reality, at least in public: "The nuclear industry, out of
self-interest in a credible licensing system as well as a broader public
interest, wants there to be a means for effective public participation. '24 9 Unless the industry is willing to give this proposition more
than mere lip service, however, its current proposals for reviving the
nuclear option simply will not work.
This is not to suggest that the current forms of participation need
be perpetuated without change. It is rather dismaying, indeed, after
thirty years of proceedings that have been described as a charade or a
sham, that we are still discussing the subject of public participation in
nuclear regulation by arguing over whether there should be a little
more or a little less intervention in formal licensing hearings. Such
proceedings, however, remain the only game in town, and the public
clamor for a meaningful opportunity to play will continue until our
society develops alternatives for enabling the citizenry to make an
informed public choice about the acceptability of nuclear risk.

248. See Harold P. Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: The
Great Delusion, 15 WM.& MARY L. REv. 503 (1974).
249. See Public Participation in Nuclear Licensing, supra note 113, at 77 (testimony of
Marcus Rowden on behalf of the American Nuclear Energy Council, the American Public
Power Association, the Atomic Industrial Forum and the Edison Electric Institute).
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